

JPRS-USA-84-011

30 November 1984

USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 8, August 1984

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

30 November 1984

USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 8, August 1984

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

CONTENTS

K. U. Chernenko's Replies to the Questions of American Journalist J. Kingsbury-Smith (pp 3-4) (not translated)	
The President and the Congress in Election Year (pp 5-16) (V. A. Savel'yev).....	1
Bovin Analyzes Reagan Visit to PRC, Highlights Disagreements (pp 17-26) (A. Ye. Bovin).....	15
Debates on NATO Military Doctrine (pp 27-39) (V. S. Shein).....	27
Trends in Administration Punitive Policy (pp 40-52) (V. A. Vlasikhin) (not translated)	
French Capital in the United States (pp 53-65) (G. N. Vlasov) (not translated)	
Gromyko Role in Creation of UN Stressed (pp 66-79) (V. M. Berezhkov).....	42
U.S. Seen Stepping Up Use of CoCom for 'Trade War' (pp 80-84) (A. V. Kunitsyn).....	58
Economic Conditions in Canada (pp 85-89) (V. V. Popov) (not translated)	
Competition in the Markets for New Science-Intensive Goods (pp 90-100) (A. A. Kuteynikov) (not translated)	

CONTENTS (Continued)

U.S. Food Packaging (pp 101-108) (A. N. Mikheyev) (not translated)	
Kokoshin Reviews Book on Non-Military Forces in U.S. Policy (pp 109-115) (N. A. Dolgopolova, A. A. Kokoshin).....	64
Book Reviews	
Two Western Books on Nuclear Proliferation Reviewed (pp 116-119) (V. F. Davydov).....	73
Review of 'Czas Reagana' by Maksymillian Berezowski (pp 119-121) (M. F. Chudakov) (not translated)	
Review of 'Distinctive Features of Canada's Industrial Development' by V. V. Popov (pp 121-122) (V. V. Dre bentsov) (not translated)	
Review of 'Labor Unions and the U.S. Society in the 20th Century. Criticism of Bourgeois-Reformist Theories' by I. M. Savel'yeva (pp 122-123) (V. E. Petrovskiy) (not translated)	
'Secrets' of the 'Stealth' Program (pp 124-127) (I. O. Lavrukhin).....	78

PUBLICATION DATA

English title : USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No 8, August 1984

Russian title : SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : V. M. Berezhev

Publishing House : Izdatel'stvo Nauka

Place of publication : Moscow

Date of publication : August 1984

Signed to press : 17 July 1984

Copies : 29,500

COPYRIGHT : Izdatel'stvo "Nauka",
"SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya",
1984

THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS IN ELECTION YEAR

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 84 (signed to press 17 Jul 84) pp 5-16

[Article by V. A. Savel'yev]

[Text] The White House and the Congress are the main institutions of the American Government. Their relations determine U.S. government behavior and the basic guidelines of U.S. foreign and domestic policy.

In a presidential election year, many factors have a significant effect on the interaction of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government. We will be examining these factors and determining the results of President Reagan's relations with the Capitol by the beginning of his campaign, the ways in which this campaign is affecting the congressional balance of power of political parties and, finally, the current prospects for a change in this balance as a result of temporary factors.

We should recall that the U.S. Congress plays a special role among government institutions. As a representative institution reflecting the comparatively broad range of interests of various segments of the ruling class, the Congress is expected to balance these interests, smooth out differences and make the most effective, from the bourgeois standpoint, government policy. This means that the Congress is not necessarily only the President's partner, but also a force controlling and regulating his behavior; when the Capitol makes policy, it clarifies and corrects White House proposals and adds new elements of its own to them.

This function of the legislative assembly is secured, as we know, by the basic legal principles of the U.S. Constitution--the division of authority, "checks and balances" and judicial oversight of the constitutionality of legislative acts. In spite of all this, congressional activity depends directly on the balance of power of political parties in the Capitol, on the degree of party cohesion and unity and on party strategy and tactics.

The American national elections are not only a show, a circus and an occasion for the manipulation of public opinion and they are not merely a method of determining trends and problems and creating the necessary political coalitions, but they are also a referendum for the elucidation of opinions on administration policy and presidential performance. In one way or another, a campaign

always asks whether administration policy should continue to be pursued (possibly, with some modifications) or whether this policy should take a new direction--that is, whether the main officials in the White House and the Congress should be replaced. This is why it is so important to sum up the results of administration activity and, in particular, to analyze the results of administration cooperation and competition with the Capitol.

Changes in the Balance of Political Power

By fall 1983 President Reagan was already trying to blame many administration failures on the Congress, or, more precisely, on its Democratic faction. In a radio broadcast of 19 November, he said: "Congress' greatest contribution consists not in what it did, but in what it did not do, for us."¹ In this way, the President made a campaign decision to return to the "anti-Washington" rhetoric that had helped him get elected in 1980.

When he addressed a smaller audience, in meetings with Republican members of Congress at the end of January and the beginning of February, the President emphasized White House achievements: "In 3 short years we have begun to change America's image. The economy is strong and it is getting stronger." Reagan cited the following data as corroboration: the reduction of inflation to 3.2 percent; the reduction of the prime interest rate by almost half since the start of the Republican administration; the growth of retail trade orders and sales and the expansion of housing construction; the revitalization of the stock market; the reduction of unemployment and the creation of more jobs than ever before. The President implied that the administration's assets would be even greater had it not been for the Democratic opposition in the Capitol.

Democrats made different appraisals. Summing up the results of the 1983 congressional session, Speaker of the House T. O'Neill said on 17 November: "If the elections were to be held tomorrow, the Democrats, according to public opinion polls, would receive from 35 to 50 additional seats in the House of Representatives. In the eyes of Americans, we have been doing the right thing,"² and consequently, the Republicans have been doing the wrong thing.

What did the President and the Congress actually do?

We should recall that the 1980 elections reflected the increasing strength of rightwing forces, even in the Capitol. In the Senate the traditionally more conservative Republican faction acquired majority status for the first time in many years (since 1954); the Democrats retained their majority in the House, but it was a much smaller majority. The Republican factions in both houses and the conservative Democrats who took their side became Ronald Reagan's basis of support.

In 1981 and 1982 the position of the Congress depended largely on the conservative Republicans, who were able, on the strength of their alliance with conservative Democrats, to impose their wishes on the liberal bloc because it represented the minority even when it was supported by moderate centrists.

The platforms of the main groups within the Congress (the conservative coalition, the center and the liberal bloc) reflected the development of trends

which had already been apparent in the 1970's. There were no radical shifts, but the makeup of the groups changed considerably. The behavior of the conservative coalition within the Republican faction was no longer dictated by conservatives, as in the 1970's, but by the ultra-right wing, with the tone of its actions set by Senator J. Helms (North Carolina) or J. McClure (Idaho). The conservative Republicans, whose number had decreased perceptibly in the faction, moved into the background. In this highly polarized atmosphere, the relatively small--particularly in the Senate--centrist group could not have a strong influence either.

Finally, liberal Republicans, who had never been distinguished by large numbers or by any perceptible influence, became a truly insignificant minority at the beginning of the 1980's.

Therefore, we could say that the political spectrum of the congressional Republican faction in the first years of the Reagan Administration consisted of three main elements: the extreme Right (or ultra-rightwing element), the conservative element and the moderate element, including the few liberals. When we compare the positions of factions in both parties, we see a striking shift: For the Republicans it was a perceptible rightward shift, and for the Democrats it was a shift toward liberalism (conventionally referred to as a shift to the "left"), with a majority of combined conservative forces in both houses.

Making use of this balance of power, President Reagan won vigorous support for his initiatives to cut income taxes, limit the busing of schoolchildren (which was supposed to achieve a "racial balance" in the schools), prevent the expansion of women's rights (he opposed the constitutional equal rights amendment and the federal subsidization of abortions), etc. In the first years of Reagan's term in office, the conservative coalition was quite successful, particularly in the Senate. The polarization of factions within it, however, was already starting in the second year of the administration. Judging by the votes on the most important election issues of 1982, the Republican faction was made even more conservative by the rightward shift of its centrist group, while the Democrats displayed a tendency toward consolidation on liberal-centrist positions.

If we examine the dynamics of party faction cohesion, we can see that the degree of unanimity in Democratic votes in the Congress rose from 69 percent to 76 percent between 1981 and 1983, while it decreased slightly for the Republicans--from 76 to 74 percent.³

As for the President's relations with the Congress, they were already undergoing a definite evolution in 1981 and 1982.

In 1981 the Capitol supported virtually all of Ronald Reagan's main initiatives (with the exception of some long-range plans); the statistics of the effectiveness of presidential interaction with the Congress were the highest for the last 16 years. The opposite tendency was seen, however, during the second year of the presidency, when the Congress has traditionally--ever since the 1960's--given presidential programs even stronger support (this was the case under the

Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations). Whereas the reduction of support for presidential proposals was insignificant in the Senate, where Republicans constituted the majority (in numerical terms, the success of administration supporters in ballots on presidential initiatives declined from 88 percent to 83 percent), opposition increased perceptibly in the House of Representatives, with a Democratic majority. The proportional successes of administration supporters decreased from 72.4 percent in 1981 to 55.8 percent in 1982.⁴ In other words, around half of Reagan's proposals failed to pass just in the House, in its plenary sessions. And the legislators usually "bury" many proposals even before they are discussed in committees.

The 1982 elections contributed to a further change in the congressional balance of power. It is true that the ratio of Republicans to Democrats remained the same in the Senate--54:46 (it changed just slightly after the death of Democrat H. Jackson. His place was taken in September 1983 by Republican D. Evans, who was then re-elected in a special election in November of that year. After that, the ratio of Republicans to Democrats in the Senate was 55:45). Even in the Senate, however, the overall political climate became perceptibly more moderate, and this promoted centrifugal tendencies in the Republican faction of the Congress.

In 1983 all of the main segments of the Republican faction exerted stronger pressure on President Reagan. Ultra-rightwing forces accused him of departing from the principles which had brought him his victory, while conservatives and centrists accused the President of being too "hard" on the unemployed, racial and ethnic minorities and women in his efforts to limit government intervention in economic affairs.

With consideration for the public feelings reflected in the 1982 elections, conservatives and even some ultra-rightwing Republicans began to question administration economic policy. One of the people closest to Ronald Reagan, Senator P. Laxalt from Nevada, headed a group of conservative legislators who tried to convince the President to slow down the growth of the military budget and simultaneously increase taxes for the purpose of combating the dangerous growth of the federal budget deficit.

Only a few legislators from the extreme right wing of the Republican faction expressed a different point of view. For example, Senator S. Symms insisted that Reagan return to the 1980 platform and carry it out in full, without making any compromises on matters of military policy: "Let Reagan be Reagan. He has the right political instincts. The most important thing is for him to be firm."⁵

The increasing friction between various conservative groups and currents within the Republican faction naturally affected the position of the Republicans in the Congress and the President's legislative strategy. Ultra-rightwing legislators, whose mass base consisted of organizations like the Moral Majority, insisted on a more active struggle for constitutional amendments or laws on prayer in the schools and against "busing"--the practice of transporting schoolchildren in buses for the purpose of maintaining a racial balance. Traditional conservatives wanted a constitutional amendment banning abortions. They made particularly zealous appeals for more intense

confrontation with the USSR. Finally, the supporters of "supply-side economics" insisted on further tax cuts and the relaxation of government economic regulations. Each current tried to impose its own view as to the priority of these issues on the administration and the Congress.

Continuity and Maneuvers in White House Policy

In essence, the race for the presidency began almost 2 years before election day: On 2 February 1983 Democratic Senator Alan Cranston was the first of the comparatively well-known contenders of that time to announce his intention to run for election. On 21 February he was joined by former Vice-President Walter Mondale. Ronald Reagan only announced his intention to run for re-election on 29 January 1984 (although the fact that he would be the Republican candidate was known in advance). But campaign considerations began to influence policy much earlier. Nevertheless, the White House's vigorous maneuvers were due less to them than to more deep-seated and long-term considerations. Reaganism as a political philosophy and practice needed a broader social base. This was the reason for the attempts to avoid ideological extremes, for the replacement of some administration members and for the search for new methods of pushing through initiatives that were stuck in the Congress. In addition, there were frequent cases of the purely opportunistic reordering of priorities. This was seen to some degree in all spheres, but mainly in domestic policy.

By 1984 little remained of the widely publicized program known as "Reaganomics." The President departed considerably from his original policy of tax cuts, budget economy and the gradual augmentation of the total amount of money in circulation and his projected broad reform of economic regulations.

Reagan's principal failure in domestic policy was his inability to reduce government spending. Projections for Reagan's first budget in March 1981 envisaged a reduction of 5.6 percent in federal spending by 1984--excluding inflation--in comparison to fiscal year 1981 expenditures. In fact, however, these expenditures did not decrease and even increased by 9.4 percent. This means that expenditures now constitute over 24 percent of the GNP, or that they surpass the level of the Carter Administration by 1.6 percent (and this was done to the accompaniment of all the grumbling about "big government"!). If there is no significant decrease in spending or if new high taxes are not instituted, the budget deficit could range from 200 billion to 250 billion dollars a year within the next 4 to 6 years.

The President repeatedly tried to prove that this situation was the result of congressional waste. But the White House and the Capitol were acting in tandem. Despite Reagan's promises, some programs remained inviolable. Although he reduced aid to the poor, he could not take the risk of cutting programs affecting the interests of relatively wealthy citizens, and he did not even ask Congress to authorize these cuts. In other cases, the President wanted to make certain cuts in spending but did not because he had to take possible congressional opposition into account. As a result, "Reaganomics" consisted only in tax cuts.

Reagan's policy line took the form of the simple redistribution of funds. There were no budget cuts; expenditures were simply "moved" from some items

to others, and in such a way that the greatest benefits were derived by the business community, especially companies engaged in military production. In real dollars, military spending has risen to 40 percent above the 1980 level in the past 3 years.

At the same time, the administration declared a "war on the poor," which took the place of the "war on poverty" once announced by President Johnson. Social programs for the poor, which absorbed only one-tenth of the federal budget, were subjected to much sharper cuts under Reagan than any other programs. It appeared that the administration wanted to ruin the entire social security system whose foundations had been laid at the time of F. Roosevelt's "New Deal."

The tax cuts were another aspect of "Reaganomics." In 1981 the personal income tax was reduced by one-fourth and corporate taxes were lowered dramatically. Reagan's policy essentially consisted in a mass-scale redistribution of income in favor of the rich and to the detriment of poor and middle strata. This reform caused many people to even suspect that if Reagan should be re-elected, he might try to eliminate the progressive income tax or at least divest it of most of its meaning.

As a result of these measures, the budget deficit reached 4.4 percent of the GNP under Reagan--the highest percentage since the time of F. Roosevelt, at which time this growth was largely due to the "great depression" and World War II. Forecasts for 1984 say that the administration increased the cumulative budget deficit by 728 billion dollars, as compared to the total debt of 996 billion reflected the overexpenditures of all postwar administrations starting with Truman. The government debt could rise to 2 trillion dollars by 1986 (or 8,300 for each American), and this problem has been widely debated during the campaign.⁶

The President and the Congress also come into constant conflict in this area. Although Reagan is inclined to put all of the blame for this on the "wasteful" Congress, which supposedly could not curb the growth of federal spending, a Congressional Budget Office analysis testifies to something else. For example, the Capitol increased the President's total requests for fiscal year 1984 by 1.17 billion dollars: The legislators reduced proposed military allocations by 4.6 billion dollars and authorized a slightly higher figure for domestic programs. Therefore, the main reasons for the annual deficit of almost 200 billion are the President's tax cuts and increased military spending.

In 1983 Ronald Reagan modified his legislative strategy and began to pay more attention to the opinions of moderate conservative congressmen, particularly to keep Republicans from being "beaten" in the 1984 elections. He made speeches to refute the belief that Republicans do not sympathize with the needy and that the "Grand Old Party," as it is called in the United States, had not done enough to revitalize the economy or to make things easier for the unemployed. The President gave up some of the cuts he had previously proposed in social programs and made an effort to keep unemployment from rising above 11 percent. Gradually, Reagan also departed from his active support of the constitutional amendments on abortions and prayer in the schools he had defended earlier.

Judging by the discussion of budget priorities for fiscal year 1984 in the Capitol, however, these pragmatic steps already appeared inadequate to Democrats and even to many Republicans. For example, the Republican leaders of the Senate majority faction (H. Baker, R. Dole and others) went against the President's wishes and made concessions to the Democrats: They rejected new large cuts in social spending and supported bills on the creation of jobs and the augmentation of medical benefits for the unemployed.

The discussion of strategic reserve oil purchases clearly demonstrated the new balance of power in the Capitol. The administration requested authorization for the daily purchase of 145,000 barrels, but the House of Representatives voted for 220,000. The leaders of the Senate Republican faction refused the request of Director D. Stockman of the Office of Management and Budget to oppose the lower house's resolution. In the Senate, 15 Republicans joined the Democrats in approval of this proposal, which meant an annual increase of a billion dollars over the amount requested by the President.⁷

In 1983 and 1984, in contrast to the first 2 years of Reagan's presidency, the Congress began to display a much greater interest in matters of foreign policy. However, although the Congress constantly discussed U.S. policy in crisis regions--in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Lebanon and Grenada--it did not challenge this policy in any major issue. This was partially due to the reluctance of Democratic leaders in the Congress, especially T. O'Neill, to make interparty conflicts "public" in view of the United States' "international commitments."

Other factors were also present: the common strategic aims of the main bourgeois parties, the influence of the traditional bipartisan approach to matters of foreign policy and what might be called the timidity or "repressed nature" of the anti-Reagan opposition, which became more active (although primarily only in the verbal respect) just recently, at the height of the campaign.

Although the Congress supported the aggression in Lebanon, it enforced the 1973 resolution on military powers, strengthening the Capitol's prerogatives, for the first time. In this way, the legislators laid the foundation for the future expansion of their legal position.

Disagreements between the President and the Congress in the sphere of foreign policy were less frequent than in the sphere of, for instance, military policy, not to mention social policy. Nevertheless, the legislators put the needle to the administration several times in this area as well. A proposal on allocations to assist antigovernment rebels in Nicaragua was blocked twice in 1983 by the House of Representatives. Eventually, however, the two houses and the President reached a compromise: The legislators agreed to allocate a total of 24 million dollars (11 million less than Reagan had requested) for this purpose, but made this additional expense conditional upon the discussion and authorization of specific allocations by the Congress.

The Congress also made repeated cuts in the President's requests for military aid to the reactionary regime in El Salvador: from 136.3 million dollars to 81.3 million in fiscal year 1983 and from 86.3 million to 64.8 million in 1984.

However, the Capitol consented, virtually without any debates, to a proposal on the allocation of 170 million dollars and 158 million respectively in fiscal years 1983 and 1984 in the form of economic assistance.³

As for expenditures on weapons, the legislators as a whole supported the majority of Reagan's requests. Nevertheless, in 1982 and 1983 the Republican administration encountered congressional resistance in this area. In 1982 the Congress approved a military budget totaling 19 billion dollars less than the administration's requests, and military expenditures for fiscal year 1983 were increased by only 5.83 percent instead of 13.1 percent.⁹ The next year the legislators were again able to slow down the rate of increase in military spending, as a result of which the military budget for FY 1984 was 5 percent higher instead of the requested 10 percent (excluding inflation). It is true, however, that the Congress made almost no cuts in expenditures on the main weapon systems: The cuts affected only secondary programs, with two exceptions: the project to resume the production of chemical weapons in 1983 and the MX program in 1984.

Although some Republicans (moderates and some conservatives) sometimes joined the opposition in votes on weapons in both houses, the Democratic split (the departure of ultra-rightwing, conservative and some centrist Democrats from the faction majority) usually gave the President the upper hand. In comparison to 1981 and 1982, however, his successes did not look impressive. When allocations for the production of toxic nerve gases (binary weapons) were first discussed in July 1983, the Senate vote was a tie (49:49). Only Vice-President's G. Bush's vote settled the matter in the administration's favor (incidentally, this was the first time since November 1977 that the vice-president had cast a vote to break a tie). Both factions split during the vote: 17 Republicans voted against the President's position, and 14 Democrats voted for it. The situation was repeated on 8 November 1983, when Bush again cast the deciding vote for Senate approval of the production of binary weapons (47:46).

In general, the Reagan Administration approached the fall of 1983, the beginning of the active campaigning stage, with extremely depressing results: The mass base of Reagan's brand of conservatism had shrunk; there were acute conflicts in the Republican Senate faction and, consequently, the President's influence in the Congress was weaker; the administration was being criticized more and more for the impasse in the arms limitation and reduction talks with the USSR. The administration anticipated new problems in connection with the imminent publication of the documents of the "Reagagate" investigation--a case involving the 1980 theft of then President J. Carter's notes for his televised debates with Reagan.

The logic of public administration and the need for political maneuvers forced Reagan to give up ideological extremes and to move toward the center in the traditional American spirit of pragmatism. But this move was impeded by Reagan's own ideological dogmatism and by the resistance of ultra-rightwing Republicans, whose bastion was now the Senate. To some degree, Reagan the politician became the hostage of the arch-conservatives.

Since the administration was forced by obvious failures in its domestic policy, particularly in the social sphere, to modify its policies long before the elections, the ultra-rightists intensified their criticism of the White House in spring and summer 1983. They even began to talk about the possibility of a split in the Republican Party and the formation of a new, "genuinely conservative party" as soon as the Reagan Administration had been permeated more by the "spirit of opportunism." This threat was not mere blackmail. The ultra-rightists already had the machinery to raise funds--the mass organizations of the "New Right" (the type headed by Viguary, Weyrich and others). Besides this, Senator J. Helms considered the possibility that he might lose his Senate seat in the 1984 elections and prepared to enter the national arena as the official leader of the "New Right."

The position of the Republicans in the Congress was also complicated by other factors. Members of the Senate faction were growing increasingly dissatisfied with the obstructionist tactics of some extreme rightwing Republicans, headed by the same Helms, who sometimes openly opposed the majority (this was the case, for example, at the end of 1982 when a proposal on an additional gasoline tax was being discussed). Senator H. Baker refused to run for re-election in 1984, and this meant that the faction had to change its leadership at a difficult time. One of the leaders of the extreme rightwing militarists, Chairman J. Tower of the influential Senate Committee on the Armed Services, announced that he would retire in 1984; the retirement of centrist Chairman M. Hatfield of the Appropriations Committee also seemed quite possible. The position of the Republicans in the Committee on the Armed Services was weakened by the death of Democrat H. Jackson, who supported all of the administration's main militarist initiatives.

This situation, judging by existing forecasts, threatened a Republican defeat in 1984. For example, according to a public opinion poll conducted by the Harris service on 18-22 August 1983, Democrats were ahead on almost all levels. According to estimates of that time, in the Senate the Republicans could anticipate a defeat in a ratio of 39:51 and the loss of the faction's majority status, and in the House of Representatives they could anticipate a loss ratio of 37:53. According to this poll, Democratic contenders W. Mondale and J. Glenn then had as much chance of victory as Reagan, if not slightly more.

Members of the administration who were skilled in the manipulation of public opinion apparently felt that ordinary methods of consolidating strength had been exhausted and gave in to the temptation to resort to extraordinary measures. One of the most effective and traditional measures in such cases is the "melodramatization" of events in the world and the use of the latest foreign policy crisis to attain domestic political goals. The provocation undertaken against the USSR in connection with the South Korean airplane was staged partially for this purpose.

In any event, this incident played into the hands of the administration and strengthened its position, at least over the short range. Reagan's popularity rose 9 percentage points above the August level. In the words of one of Reagan's closest advisers, the incident "made things easier for the administration in many respects": It strengthened the President's position in the

Congress on matters of military policy (the military budget and the development and deployment of new missile systems from the MX to the Pershing II) and it strengthened the willingness of West European leaders to deploy American medium-range missiles on their territory. The leader of the Republican majority in the Senate, H. Baker, and other influential members of Congress advocated a tougher and more "forceful" policy in relations with the USSR.

As always in these cases, people rallied round the President during the first stage of the foreign policy crisis. Ultra-rightwing legislators, such as J. Helms, were probably the only exception. They demanded even "harsher measures and more resolute sanctions against the USSR," particularly the cessation of arms limitation talks, the continuation of U.S. military preparations, the "prohibition" of Soviet participation in the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles, the exertion of stronger economic pressure on the Soviet Union, etc. But the approach of the Congress as a whole changed little. The resolutions adopted in both houses to "censure" the USSR in connection with the incident were not accompanied by any actions: Proposals of "tougher" economic sanctions against the USSR were rejected, as was a proposed grain embargo.

The interparty campaign struggle began to have a noticeable effect on the alignment of forces in the Senate in September 1983, disrupting the previously unanimous support of the White House by the main groups in the Capitol in these matters. For example, in a vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 21 September, all 10 Republicans voted against a resolution calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze on U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons, and 7 of the 8 Democrats (excluding only ultra-rightist E. Zorinsky) supported it.

The division primarily along party lines was also distinct in another area--in discussions of American military intervention abroad. Whereas the Republicans agreed with the President and supported administration policy in Lebanon, El Salvador and Grenada, Democrats either advised the White House to be more cautious or pointedly criticized its behavior. Although in September 1983 the Senate voted to allow the President to leave American infantrymen in Lebanon for 18 months (54:46), virtually all of the Democrats opposed the Republicans (Democrats--2 "for," 43 "against"; Republicans--52:3).

There was a similar situation in the Senate when the U.S. aggression in Grenada was being discussed. On 28 October 1983, on the initiative of Democrat G. Hart, a contender for the presidential nomination, the Senate voted for the withdrawal of American troops from Grenada within 60 days after the beginning of military operations in accordance with a law on military powers (64:20).¹⁰ It is true that this restriction, which was adopted in the form of an amendment, did not go into force because the entire bill was later rejected.

On the last day of the first session of the 98th Congress, Senate Majority Leader H. Baker said that "the Congress, and especially the Senate, have never been regarded as an example of effective government control." Nevertheless, in Baker's words, the legislators were constantly successful by virtue of their "bipartisan spirit."¹¹ Statistics, on the other hand, testify to the weaker unity of both parties and the exacerbation of interparty conflicts as campaigning grew more active. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility of a

unanimous Republican and Democratic approach to some major problems (social security, legislation on the creation of jobs, a resolution on Congress' military powers and some bills on appropriations). However, it was not these "bipartisan" agreements that set the tone in the political struggle.

A series of "mini-scandals" injured the reputation of federal agencies under the President's jurisdiction and, therefore, his own reputation. These included exposures of the CIA, the Defense Department, the National Security Council, the Environmental Protection Agency, USIA and the government Synthetic Fuels corporation. From time to time, President Reagan, who is known as a "master of televised political seduction," was able to "seduce" the American public with ease and thereby remove reports of unethical behavior by administration members from the agenda. Considering the special nature of an election year, however, it is possible that the Democrats might have something like the Watergate card up their sleeves, especially in view of the way in which some of Reagan's closest associates have abused their power, particularly E. Meese. In this respect, the Capitol's political potential and investigative authority cannot be underestimated, as R. Nixon's resignation once proved.

The Administration's Campaign Bridgehead

Congress, as the earlier analysis of its activity in the early 1980's demonstrates, took an active part in determining the basic guidelines of Washington's domestic and foreign policy. Far from all of the different ideological and political groups of legislators had equal influence on administration policies, however. The dominant ultra-rightwing and conservative groups, especially in the Republican faction, were responsible for the tone of debates in the Capitol, the position of the majority of legislators on major issues and the decisions made by the Congress.

The Republican majority in the Senate gave the leaders of the Senate faction an opportunity to play a key role in the power triangle (White House, the Republican-controlled Senate and the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives). It was precisely the Republican leaders in the Senate who usually served as middlemen and took the initiative in the search for compromises. In the atmosphere of a more narrow party approach than usual at the beginning of the 1980's, many proposals approved by the House of Representatives were either rejected or revised by the Senate. Republicans in the Senate were able to win support for Reagan's position in the majority of discussions. For example, in October 1983 the Senate rejected a resolution adopted in May of the same year by the House on a freeze on the testing, manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the House of Representatives twice voted to prohibit the administration's covert assistance of antigovernmental groups in Nicaragua, the Senate rejected this proposal. It is true, however, that the Republican leadership later agreed to a compromise with regard to the amount of this assistance.

In some cases, however, even the Republican majority in the Senate could not help the President. This happened during votes on some budget resolutions, when moderate Republicans joined the Democratic faction in opposing administration proposals, or, for instance, during the discussion of the production of chemical weapons, when the split in the Senate Republican vote helped the

House of Representatives in its ultimate refusal to allocate funds for the new generation of binary toxic substances.

By the beginning of its fourth year, the Reagan Administration had to deal with a situation in which the Democratic faction had unified its ranks to the maximum for the first time in the last three decades and was putting up the greatest resistance to White House policy in 1983. In Congress, and especially in the House of Representatives, the strength of the Democratic faction was particularly evident in interparty skirmishes. In addition to this, the conservative coalition--the traditional alliance of Republicans with southern Democrats--grew much weaker between 1981 and 1983. All of this was reflected in the reduced impact of presidential performance in the Congress from year to year. The proportional number of bills supported by Reagan and approved by the Congress was 82.4 percent in 1981, after which it fell to 72.4 percent in 1982, 67.1 percent in 1983 and finally to 55 percent in the first 3 months of 1984. Furthermore, in 1983 the Senate supported more than four-fifths of the President's initiatives, while the House of Representatives, the main center of the Democratic opposition, supported less than half. Indicators of the impact of Reagan's performance in the legislative arena were lower in the third year of his presidency than the indicators of D. Eisenhower and R. Nixon (during their first terms in office), J. Kennedy, L. Johnson and J. Carter. Only G. Ford had worse results.¹²

When the legislators discussed the Pentagon budget for fiscal year 1985 this summer, they made only slight cuts in the administration's record-setting requests. Once again, arms buildup programs did not suffer, with the exception of the same two: The Capitol again refused to approve the plans for the production of binary gases and perceptibly delayed the deployment of the MX system.

Another interesting feature was Congress' more active intervention in Washington diplomacy. The Democratic majority in the House made a resolute effort to stop financing the activity of counterrevolutionaries waging an armed struggle against Nicaragua and to prohibit the use of American combat units in this region. Both houses tried to pressure the White House by adopting a number of amendments on American-Soviet relations. The Congress advised President Reagan to resume the talks cut off by Washington on the universal and total nuclear test ban, to begin talks with the USSR on antisatellite weapons and to submit the treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, signed in 1974 and 1976, to the Senate for ratification. This was probably the first time in recent years that the Republican administration had been advised to make constructive changes in policy toward the Soviet Union not by individual legislators, but by fairly large and politically influential groups in the Capitol. Although this activity was partially due to the start of the campaign and the intensification of the interparty struggle, it also reflected the concern of certain groups about the irresponsibility, and sometimes even the simple adventurism, of White House foreign policy.

After looking over the data on Congress' role in Washington policymaking, we can say that it made definite changes in this policy, primarily in the social sphere, even to the point of forcing the President to give up his struggle

for constitutional amendments he had previously defended. Presidential initiatives underwent revision both in the amount of the allocations requested (the refusal to make cuts in certain programs) and in the "qualitative" respect, indicating a change in the essential policy line (the constitutional amendments and so forth). The Capitol's adjustments in economic matters were primarily quantitative. During the discussion of military issues, the unity of the Republicans allowed them to push the President's main proposals through the Congress, but some programs were delayed and the overall growth of Pentagon appropriations was checked to some extent. Legislators also supported the main aspects of the President's foreign policy, despite the growing American worries about events in explosive parts of the world.

Therefore, Congress made primarily secondary adjustments in administration policy. This was largely due to the preponderance of conservative Republicans in the Senate. Nevertheless, the President's political and party opposition in the Capitol gradually grew stronger. This tendency was the result of erosion in the ranks of the Republican faction.

This, in turn, was the reason for the revision of the original Republican program. It was intended to secure legislative reinforcement of the "conservative counterrevolution" and dismantle the bourgeois-reformist bases of U.S. government policy which had been taking shape since the time of F. Roosevelt's "New Deal." On the strength of the Democratic resistance, which could not be broken by the Republicans, the Congress toned down the Reaganists' ultra-rightwing initiatives in the sphere of domestic policy. The reasons for this were, first of all, the "dual power" in the Congress (the Democratic majority in the House and the Republican majority in the Senate) and the Republican shift to a more moderate course in both houses in 1982; secondly, the weakening of the internal unity of the Republican faction--its traditional trump card in battles with Democrats; thirdly, the exacerbation of conflicts within U.S. ruling circles over the far from always effective, as it turned out, "alternative solutions" of the Republican administration; finally, the growing opposition of broad segments of the American public, who had learned in just over 3 years, and through their own experience, what lay behind the promises of Ronald Reagan and his supporters.

In the few weeks remaining before the elections, Congress is not likely to discuss any serious matters, unless in a purely formal manner. The coming elections and the current balance of power dictate caution for the majority of legislators.

FOOTNOTES

1. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT (CQWR), 26 November 1983, p 2467.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 31 December 1983, p 2791.
4. "Congressional Quarterly Almanac--1982," Wash., 1983, p 18-C.

5. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 31 January 1983, pp 20-21.
6. Ibid., 13 February 1984, pp 20-21.
7. NEWSWEEK, 10 October 1983, p 43.
8. CQWR, 26 November 1983, p 2476.
9. "Congressional Quarterly Almanac--1982," p 73.
10. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 29-30 October 1983.
11. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 18 November 1983, p S17190.
12. CQWR, 31 December 1983, p 2782; THE NEW YORK TIMES, 22 April 1984.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1984

8588

CSO: 1803/1

BOVIN ANALYZES REAGAN VISIT TO PRC, HIGHLIGHTS DISAGREEMENTS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 84 (signed to press 17 Jul 84) pp 17-26

[Article by A. Ye. Bovin: "Washington-Beijing: A Contradictory Partnership"]

[Text] American President R. Reagan's visit to the PRC was one of the major events in the political calendar of 1984. The objective motive behind the new round of Sino-American negotiations at the highest level--irrespective of each of the sides' strategic and tactical calculations--is to continue the search for a modus vivendi which would answer the interests of both the United States and the PRC, or, as the American President said, to continue the "process of reconciliation."

Reagan certainly had something to continue. Since 1972 relations between the two powers, despite certain zigzags and regressions (the latter being connected precisely with R. Reagan), have on the whole been in the ascendant. During this time reciprocal trade turnover has increased more than 50 times over. This year its volume is expected to be in the area of 6 billion dollars. The United States is the PRC's third largest partner in foreign trade. For the sake of comparison, let us note that the total volume of U.S. trade with Taiwan amounts to approximately 16 billion dollars.¹ The Americans have already invested 700 million dollars in China's economy. More than 100 American firms have opened branches in China and 50 Chinese firms have done the same in the United States. A program for scientific and technical exchange includes 300 projects. Approximately 10,000 Chinese students and post-graduates are studying in the United States. In turn, approximately 300 American scholars, namely students in the liberal arts, are taking special courses in China. American political figures on various levels regularly visit Beijing. Their Chinese colleagues visit Washington less frequently, but nevertheless with sufficient regularity.

Reagan's appearance in the White House with his militant anticommunism introduced significant elements of uncertainty into the prospects of Sino-American relations. In the opinion of the new American President, "Red China" occupied a firm place in the political netherworld. Reagan called the regime of Mao Zedong's successors "as authoritarian and repressive as before, a state monopoly based upon violence and propaganda and destroying the humane traditions of the Chinese people."² Beijing preaked up its ears. Two years of clashes and frictions began.

A serious set-to flared up because of Taiwan, for which R. Reagan very loudly demonstrated his sympathies, backing them up with weapon shipments. Matters in the economic sphere also became more complicated. In accordance with the U.S. President's directions, imports of Chinese textiles were frozen. In response, the Chinese reduced their grain purchases and refused to buy soybeans, cotton and synthetic fibers. In the end, under pressure from his advisers who contended that "Beijing is worth a mass," R. Reagan backed down. He was forced to exchange fat ideological banknotes into the denominations of political pragmatism. Promises were made to gradually cut down deliveries of weapons to Taiwan. As far as textiles were concerned, China was given permission to increase its exports to the United States by 3.5 percent annually. For the sake of comparison: Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea are restricted to a 1-percent growth in exports. I do not think that R. Reagan has altered his opinions of China, but he has changed his policy. "The cautious conservative in Reagan (striving to play China off against the Soviet Union)," noted the CHICAGO TRIBUNE, "gained the upper hand over the ideologist gripped with nostalgia (supporting the Nationalists against the Communists)."³ Thus the visit became possible which many American observers termed "the triumph of pragmatism over ideology."

Obviously recalling various blunders which had clouded previous visits, the American President carefully prepared for the negotiations in Beijing. He had talks with H. Kissinger. He spoke on the telephone with R. Nixon and J. Carter. He breakfasted with experts on Chinese affairs. Finally, he brought his wife Nancy into the matter. If he should need any additional information on China, R. Reagan told Chinese journalists, he could always turn to his wife, "since she has more time for reading and she has read a great deal of literature on the Chinese people, stories and documentary material--more than I have."⁴

And so, what did the American President wish to achieve by embarking upon negotiations with the Chinese leaders?

We will begin, perhaps, not with politics, but with political intrigues, since one is indivisible from the other in Washington. It is totally obvious that R. Reagan wanted to strengthen his chances in the presidential elections by visiting Beijing. The world press said a great deal on the subject and with great emphasis.

Here are a few typical opinions. Japan's TOKYO SHIMBUN wrote that R. Reagan's visit to Beijing "represents a large-scale meretricious undertaking for the purpose of demonstrating both within the United States and beyond its boundaries that there is a new 'honeymoon' in Sino-American relations." France's LE MATINE remarked: Having suffered defeat in Lebanon and with difficulty avoiding yet another failure in Central America, R. Reagan "will have to try in Beijing to restore his image as leader of the Western world--one who is decisive but is also ready for dialogue. This task is made all the more complex in view of the fact that for many years Reagan has been a main advocate of support for Taiwan. This goes a long way toward explaining those numerous 'appeasing statements' made by the U.S. President on the eve of the

visit." The West German SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG expressed the opinion that the organizers of the President's election campaign had grounds for satisfaction: "They have been given an exotic publicity film which must demonstrate to the American voters that Reagan the hardened anticommunist has no fear of conducting negotiations with the leaders of a communist state when the question is one of securing peace."

And here are the Americans' opinions. "Our surveys indicate," said G. Lake, press-secretary for Reagan's election campaign, "that what people fear most of all is that Ronald Reagan could lead us into war. This first visit of his to a communist country testifies that he is prepared to conduct a dialogue, although he also has firm (anticommunist--A. B.) convictions. This refutes the claims of the Democrats who say that the President is a man bellicose to the point of recklessness."⁵ When Air Force One touched down in Beijing, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL reported: "Ronald Reagan's campaign for re-election began on television screens throughout America.... The arrival scene and the production put on by the White House and the State Department (professional producers were brought in for this purpose and, as one American official claims, there were 'no less than a dozen' rehearsals) occupied a central place in the morning news programs of all the American television networks."⁶ The whole week continued in the same way. This is precisely what Reagan wanted. And here he succeeded.

However, this pre-election political show, so important for Reagan personally, was only the external aspect of the visit for the rest of the world. The internal, strictly political aspects of the visit are much more important.

The direct task which the ruling U.S. circles obviously set themselves lay in strengthening American positions in East Asia and in the Pacific basin. Following the fashionable Western concept of the gradual decline of "Atlantic civilization" and the ascent of "Pacific Ocean civilization," the American President did not spare words in order to substantiate the "vitally important national interests" of the United States in this region. "The Pacific Ocean basin is one of the most rapidly expanding markets for American commodities, services and capital investments," he said in Hawaii. And also: "We are about to embark upon the next important stage in our relations with the countries of the Pacific Ocean basin.... America and its Pacific neighbors are the countries to which the future belongs."

It would be difficult, of course, to reproach Reagan for his failure to mention the vitally important interests of the Soviet Union in the Pacific basin. But he could have spoken of China's vitally important interests--after all, he was going there. But he did not mention them. He did not have the courage to do this. It is true that, once in China, he did have his wits about him enough not to mention America's "leading role" in the Pacific basin. But not even 10 days had passed when the U.S. President made the following statement on American television about his visit to China on 9 May: This visit "demonstrates America's awareness of its responsibility as a country called upon to play a leading role in the Pacific region...." This is how Washington understands "equal" relations with its new Asiatic friend.

Even without special mention, however, U.S. intentions to appropriate this very basin are sufficiently discernible. Reagan's Chinese partners were eloquently silent on Pacific subjects. They were interested in more concrete, more prosaic things. And the Pacific Ocean.... Well, it is not going to go anywhere, and in 50 or 100 years when even the Americans have stopped talking about America's "leading role"....

Not of least interest to the Americans was the possibility of securing sanctions from the PRC for the U.S. military presence in Asia. Of course, the Americans will have to pursue their policies irrespective of the stand taken by Beijing. However, China's support will give them significant propagandist trump cards. They had their reservations, but the Chinese eventually met the Americans halfway. Deng Xiaoping, chairman of the CCP Central Advisory Commission, said to R. Reagan: "We have no objections to an increase in U.S. armed forces. The increase will help to create a stable restraining force." "Clarification" of Deng Xiaoping's thoughts followed the next day: "We understand that up until now the United States has increased its military preparations in order to counteract the increase in Soviet armed forces. But we are against this being detrimental to the interests of other countries."⁷ The Chinese explained that the stress lay on the second sentence.

Today Washington can be almost satisfied. The Chinese "reservations" are sufficiently diffused and carefully bypass the anti-Soviet nature of U.S. military preparations. At the same time, the recent evolution of PRC foreign policy does not exclude the fact that with time these "reservations" could become more weighty.

Finally, the main thing Reagan wished to achieve was to wreck the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations and to switch the PRC onto his anti-Soviet course in one way or another. All of the other political aspects of the visit were focused on this point. This was helped by the President's importunate arguments about an "increase in Soviet military might" and also by his emphasis upon those problems, such as Afghanistan or Indochina, where China's positions are at variance with those of the Soviet Union but correspond to those of the United States.

On the eve of R. Reagan's visit, R. Nixon wrote an article for NEWSWEEK under the heading "The New Chinese Card." The motive behind the "unofficial alliance" between the United States and the PRC, which was formed in 1972, R. Nixon wrote, was anti-Sovietism. But now times have changed: "If we allow fear of the Soviet threat to become the only incentive which unites us, then we are basically putting our faith into alien hands."⁸ And R. Nixon gave R. Reagan some advice: "We must welcome the efforts of the Soviet Union and China to lessen the tension in their relations rather than fear these efforts." And more: "It would be a fatal error to think that a duel between the two communist giants will answer American interests. Such a conflict would inevitably turn into a world war. Similarly, the leaders in Beijing must understand that it is in China's interests that the United States and the Soviet Union lessen the tension in their relations."⁹ Although R. Nixon's article is overflowing with the standard anti-Soviet cliches, the conclusions he draws merit attention.

But R. Reagan did not follow R. Nixon's advice. For him, a "Chinese card" has meaning only when it is in an anti-Soviet deck. Speaking at his reception on 27 April and addressing Zhao Ziyang, premier of the PRC State Council, he said: "As we all know, our cooperation is not only founded on the wish to strengthen the economies of our countries. At the present time peace throughout the world is being threatened by a great power which is directing its resources and its energy not toward economic progress but toward increasing its military might. Changes in the balance of military strength during the last decade have made friendship and trust between us even more vitally important.... China and the United States will act together against expansionism and hegemonism to preserve peace and to defend their sovereignty and independence." Similar statements were included in Reagan's televised speech.

The Chinese did not pursue this topic, at least not on the official level. Nevertheless, they issued anti-Soviet statements as well as immoderate praise of the charms of capitalism when they published R. Reagan's speeches. "We regret," said L. Speakes, a White House spokesman, "that the President's statements which would have made it possible for the Chinese people to better understand our country and its people were not included in the Chinese media's publication of his speech." Official representatives of the PRC explained their actions: "It would have been inappropriate for the Chinese mass media to disseminate statements by President Reagan concerning third countries, as well as certain other of his pronouncements."

This episode was actively debated by all who followed the course of the visit. Under the heading "The Chinese Reject Reagan's Appeal for Cooperation with the United States," THE WASHINGTON POST published an article which said: "President Reagan appealed to the Chinese leaders on Friday to join the United States in the struggle against the Soviet Union, but the Chinese prefer to maintain their independent position and refuse to follow the Americans."¹⁰ Western Europe evaluated the situation in a similar way. "China firmly rejected R. Reagan's attempts to draw it into an alliance against the Soviet Union and emphasized the independence of its foreign policy during the American President's 6-day stay in the country," noted London FINANCIAL TIMES on 30 April. A reviewer for the West German newspapers WESTFALISCHE RUNDSCHAU wrote on 4 May: "The Americans' hopes of organizing strategic co-operation with China and of forming a 'Washington-Beijing axis' are unrealizable under present conditions, since this is not in Beijing's current foreign political interests."

I would refrain from making such strong judgments in this context at present. There is no doubt that changes do take place in PRC foreign policy, and this is particularly noticeable if one is to take as a reference point the Chinese leaders' former thesis of organizing a "strategic alliance" between China, the United States, Japan and Western Europe, which would be directed against the Soviet Union. Now this thesis is not being mentioned. The PRC is in the process of forming a new, independent foreign policy course. But the inertia of the past continues to have an effect. Although R. Reagan's open and blatant anti-Sovietism did not give rise to rapture this time, the desire to utilize the "American card" to put pressure on the USSR is not likely to have been overcome.

Economic matters occupied a prominent place in the Beijing negotiations. American business is hypnotized by the potential capacity of the Chinese market. The Americans would like to tie China to the vast U.S. economic machine so that economic levers could be used for the exertion of political pressure if necessary. It might seem as if the Chinese are willing to climb hand and foot into the trap that has been set for them. But the situation is much more complex than this. This will be discussed in further detail below.

At this point let us note that, appearing in a country which, to quote THE WASHINGTON POST, he had "scorned or criticized for the greater part of his political career," Reagan tried his utmost to create a favorable impression on the Chinese. The same WASHINGTON POST wrote of the "President's refined verbal bowing and scrapping."¹¹

And this was the case. Here are just two of the many low bows the American President never tired of making. "America's interest in China," he said in Beijing on 27 April 1984, "our friendly feelings toward your people and our respect for China's great contribution to the progress of civilization have their roots in the beginning of our history. You might be interested to know that the furniture in the dining rooms of our first three presidents--George Washington, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson--was in the Chinese style, which testifies to the fact that our founding fathers were greatly attracted by the high artistic values of your country." The logic here is totally incontrovertible!

Here is another example of the President's eloquence: "For Americans, the very mention of China holds a special fascination. It calls to mind a picture of the River Yangtze, the desert stretching to the North, the bamboo forests in the Southwest in which pandas, golden monkeys and other animals found only in China roam, the rich fertile fields and lands in the East, and vast cities such as Shanghai and Beijing."

It is difficult to say what the Chinese thought when they heard these compliments. They probably found it pleasant. The possibility that they were laughing on the inside cannot be excluded. In any case, they behaved with much more restraint. Reciprocal hymns in honor of America did not follow.

We will now approach the question from the other side: What did the Chinese want? What was Beijing counting on when it met one of the most reactionary U.S. presidents with such pomp?

The main concern of the present Chinese leaders is to modernize the country, overcome its centuries-old backwardness and turn it into a highly developed state and a contemporary world power with all of the appropriate attributes. They are counting on the use of American economic and technical potential, American science and technology and American capital to speed up the program of China's modernization.

As the statistics cited at the beginning of the article illustrate, the Americans are prepared to meet China on this. It is true that the White

House is in no hurry to abolish all of the traditional restrictions on trade and cooperation with "communist countries." This has caused displeasure in Beijing. In a talk with R. Reagan, Zhao Ziyang noted that obstacles are inhibiting the expansion of scientific, technical and economic cooperation between the two countries and he expressed the hope that the U.S. Government would take measures to eliminate these obstacles. He called the law on foreign assistance "discriminatory" since, in the words of Zhao Ziyang, it contradicts the American President's statement that "China is a friendly and nonaligned country." Reagan replied that he ordered the relaxation of measures to control exports to China in June of last year. "Our policy in matters concerning the transfer of technology," he said, "will also in future be formulated with consideration for the general development of our relations and means of expanding cooperation between our countries." The wording was not even ambiguous: If your policies suit us, you will receive our technology.

At the moment, Beijing policies do suit Washington. During the visit an agreement was initialed on cooperation between China and the United States in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and this creates a legal basis for the sale of American nuclear reactors, their components, nuclear materials and technology to the PRC. An agreement was signed on taxes to stimulate the flow of American investments. A protocol was also signed on cultural cooperation between the PRC and the United States in 1984-85, including "extensive links" between Voice of America and Beijing Radio, as well as documents on cooperation in the spheres of scientific and technical information and the management of industrial science and technology.

Considering the significant breach between the PRC and the United States along almost all economic, scientific and technical parameters, it must be admitted that the Chinese are taking a risk and that there is the objective possibility that the keys to the modernization of China will be passed to the other side of the Pacific Ocean. But this is only a possibility. China obviously hopes that those in power will always be able to keep the situation under control and to prevent American capital from having a distorting effect upon the nature of social relations. In the final analysis, everything will depend on the political decisions adopted in Beijing and on the direction of the path China will tread.

The question of U.S. participation in the modernization of the Chinese Army was not specifically examined in Reagan's talks with the Chinese leaders. This matter was discussed at a different level. Zhang Aiping, the PRC minister of national defense, received the U.S. deputy secretary of defense to exchange opinions on Sino-American cooperation in the sphere of military technology. As is well-known, the Chinese have shown an interest in buying contemporary antitank and antiaircraft systems, as well as radar equipment. The United States agreed in principle to react favorably to this. Negotiations on this subject were continued in June when Zhang Aiping visited the United States.

Of course, no one can dispute China's right to have an army equipped with contemporary military equipment. This is not a matter of weapons or of military equipment. It is a matter of politics. It is one thing to talk of

the army of a peace-loving socialist state, but it is another matter entirely when that army serves a state which is prepared to "teach a lesson" to its neighbors with the aid of this very same army. It is precisely this that troubles the Asian community. "Parliamentary circles," Indonesia's OBSERVER wrote in May this year, for example, "do not conceal their concern with regard to U.S. efforts to speed up the development and modernization of the Chinese armed forces. Parliamentarians quite clearly indicate that the United States is making a mistake by counting on directing China's military might against the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the PRC could use this military strength in the South." Their concern is completely understandable....

The political aspects of Reagan's visit, if one views them from Beijing's point of view, obviously amount to the fact that friendly relations with the United States will increase China's weight in world politics and, in particular, broaden the possibilities for political maneuvering in the Moscow-Beijing-Washington "triangle." In one American newspaper the situation was described as follows: "China reminds one of an intriguing woman flirting first with the rich neighbor on one side of her (the United States) and then with the strong man on her other side (the USSR). When one of them comes too close, she cries 'no!' and swears that she is a devoted supporter of the Third World and wishes to have nothing to do with men."¹² The caricature is not the best method of political analysis. Consequently, we will turn to discussion on a different plane. "As a result of President Reagan's visit to China," wrote the Moscow correspondent for THE WASHINGTON POST in the 5 May issue, "Beijing's position with regard to the two superpowers is now more clearly defined and, to all appearances, China's role in the triangle game will become more balanced. This is the opinion of many diplomatic observers here, who believe that China has made it clear that it wishes to lessen the tension in its relations with Moscow while simultaneously maintaining its relations with Washington." The deputy chief editor of this newspaper, R. Kaiser, puts the emphasis elsewhere: "From 1972 to 1979 inclusive, three American presidents in turn have effectively played the 'China card' against the Soviet Union.... Reagan's visit to Beijing signified a turning point: Now the Chinese are playing the American card and this new form of the same method is in the interests of Beijing but could hardly be said to be in the interests of America." At the time, Kaiser concludes, when "the American President was repairing the damage that he had caused himself, the Chinese showed that they had altered the nature of the Sino-Soviet-American triangle."¹³

The fact is that Sino-Soviet relations have really begun to improve. And this truly frightens America. Under these conditions the PRC is strongly tempted to use the "Soviet card" to make the Americans more complaisant, and the "American card" to bring pressure to bear upon Moscow. I fear that Beijing has not resisted this temptation. However, in politics, thinking in terms of a card game (today one wins and the other loses, and tomorrow perhaps they will change roles) could hardly have been acceptable even in the pre-nuclear age. And in the nuclear age there is only one firm, stable and mutually advantageous variety of relations within the USSR-PRC-U.S. triangle. This variety is good-neighbor relations between all of its apexes. This is what must be striven for, whereas the present "card game" can only complicate an already complex situation.

However, let us return to Beijing. Besides different conceptions of the purpose and direction of possible strategic alliances, the negotiations reveal the existence of fundamental differences on a number of more concrete political problems. During Reagan's meeting with Hu Yaobang, general secretary of the CCP Central Committee, the latter complained that "many American friends misunderstand China's foreign policy." The Chinese criticized U.S. policy in Central America and in the Middle East in one form or another, spoke in favor of the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea and noted the United States' wrong, from their point of view, attitude toward the "Third World."

Taiwan was not forgotten either. Ronald Reagan has a very definite reputation on this score. In 1979, when J. Carter denounced the treaty "on mutual defense" with Taiwan to pay for the restoration of diplomatic relations with the PRC, Ronald Reagan, as THE NEW YORK TIMES reminded, said: "We have callously betrayed an old friend and ally" and "we have done this with abominable severity."¹⁴ Reagan began his 1980 election campaign with an appeal to "maintain intergovernmental relations" with Taiwan. Then, as has already been said above, political considerations forced the President to sing a different tune. However, as a member of the State Department told the FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "the President's heart belongs to Taiwan."

The Chinese seemed to launch a massed attack on R. Reagan on the Taiwan problem. "If there is any problem which can exert a negative influence upon the development of relations between China and the United States," said Zhao Ziyang, "then it is the Taiwan problem." Deng Xiaoping called the Taiwan problem "a key problem in Sino-American relations." He explained to R. Reagan that the present system on the island would not be changed after Taiwan's peaceful unification with the mainland. Speaking with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian said that the Taiwan problem is the "main obstacle" in relations between the PRC and the United States. The minister demanded an immediate reduction in American arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese expressed concern over the fact that "certain people" in the United States nurture the intention of raising the level of relations between the United States and Taiwan or even speak of Taiwan's "independence." The NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY summed up the negotiations centering on Taiwan as follows: "Without resolving this problem it will be impossible to form relations of mutual trust on a stable basis."

Of course, the Chinese do have grounds for concern, and considerable ones. Whereas the United States sold military equipment valued at 300 million dollars to Taiwan in 1981, in 2 years the figure leaped up to 800 million dollars. During fiscal year 1984 Washington must supply Taipei with weapons worth 780 million dollars. Clearly, 780 is less than 800, and the Americans can say that they are fulfilling the promise contained in the communique of 17 August 1982--to gradually reduce, and then cease military supplies to Taiwan. This is formally true, but basically a mockery. In general, the aforementioned communique is still only paper. Precisely on the day when the communique was signed, Reagan said: "Absolutely nothing has changed. We will also continue to arm Taiwan." The U.S. President also took a firm stand in Beijing. "It is true that we will maintain our long-standing historical relations and friendship with the people of Taiwan," he told Chinese

journalists. And he added: Although the U.S. Government supports stronger relations with Beijing, "we also do not think that it would be right to renounce old friends in order to gain new ones."

Of course, the Chinese realize that the United States is actually pursuing a policy of "two Chinas." But pragmatic considerations obviously gained the upper hand over national feelings. Despite its formal protest, Beijing is basically turning a blind eye to the true state of affairs so that the hand of the giver does not hold less.

And Washington is shamelessly making use of this. Many people in America believe that China will put up with anything because it derives far greater benefit than the United States from Sino-American relations. But not everyone believes this. I quote an excerpt from an interview given by the well-known American expert on China, Professor Arthur Barnett, to U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT. Two questions and two answers:

"Question: You referred to the fact that China does not wish to be regarded as the junior partner of one of the superpowers. What do you feel about the opinion of some Americans that Sino-American relations are more advantageous to Beijing than to the United States?

"Answer: To the superficial observer it could really seem that in our efforts to humor China we are making compromises in the economic and political spheres, and so forth. However, I would object to this--after all, we are much stronger than China and also much richer, and so it does not seem to me surprising that we must give a great deal more than we take in many areas of Sino-American relations.

"Question: Why should the United States do this?

"Answer: If we take a broader approach to the matter, then the significance of good relations with China for the United States' general strategic interests is so great that this is a low price to pay. In return, we are being given the opportunity to preserve a situation in East Asia in which China is not our enemy, which makes it possible to avoid a repetition of the state of affairs when we spent billions of dollars for 25 years and lost many thousands of people in an attempt to neutralize what seemed to us to be a more serious danger in the form of a China hostile to the United States. Consequently, the price we are paying now is nothing in comparison to what we are gaining from this."¹⁵

In my opinion, Professor Barnett is right. But there is the impression that Beijing is more in agreement with his opponent.

Let us sum up our general conclusions. As a whole, Reagan's visit to the PRC signified one more step along the path of cooperation between the two countries, primarily in the economic sphere. In the strictly political sphere, there is more ambiguity. The American President did not succeed in implementing his main political scheme--to include China in the United States' anti-Soviet strategy. The Chinese did not succeed in softening R. Reagan's

position on Taiwan. There was agreement on some concrete political problems (Afghanistan and Kampuchea), but there was also disagreement (Central America, the Middle East and South Korea). These disagreements existed before the visit and they remained after it. Beijing is satisfied: It has managed to increase its access to American technology and to reaffirm its status as a great power, the interests of which "even" America has to consider. Washington is also satisfied: It has managed to increase its access to the Chinese market and to score points in the battle for the White House.

Washington's satisfaction is also connected with the fact that Reagan's visit is regarded there as an additional impulse contributing to China's socio-economic reorientation. The initial premises were clearly set out in the aforementioned article by R. Nixon: "China is a country in which a billion of the most gifted people in the world live, and which possesses colossal natural resources that could make it an economic giant in the next century. However, it will achieve this in spite of communism and not because of it."¹⁶

We will leave R. Nixon's interpretation of the changes taking place in China on his conscience. We will limit ourselves to the statement that the former President's logic obviously leaves much to be desired. A "stable communist regime" based upon a capitalist economy is nonsense. Here a choice must be made. Either--or. Reagan turned out to be more consistent than Nixon. Speaking at Fairbanks University in the State of Alaska on 1 May, the U.S. President said: "I was pleased by some of what we saw. China's economy is more open. The Chinese allow the peasants to keep and sell some of their products. This is the first manifestation of the spirit of the free market, and it has already infused China's economy with new, life-giving impetus. I believe that this has also contributed to the happiness of the Chinese people and opened up the way to a more just society."

In Reagan's vocabulary, a "more just society" means a capitalist society, and in the President's opinion, the way to this society is open. But we will nevertheless hope that he is mistaken. We will hope that the American capital flowing into China as payment for the creation of "the spirit of the free market" there will ultimately turn out to be payment for a historic mistake.

Finally, the timing of the visit, its nature and its tone testify to the fact that the Chinese leadership has decided to support Reagan during a period which is of vital importance to him--election year. And this means--irrespective of subjective intentions--that it also supports his policies, policies which are profoundly reactionary, anticommunist and aimed at militarizing political relations and intensifying the arms race. Whom does this benefit? Does this approach serve to strengthen peace throughout the world? Does it help strengthen progressive, socialist forces? Does it help to stabilize the situation in Asia? These questions inevitably arise in the minds of those who analyze the results of Ronald Reagan's visit to the PRC.

FOOTNOTES

1. TIME, 2 April 1984, p 54.
2. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 28 April 1984.
3. THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 25 April 1984.
4. THE WASHINGTON POST, 22 April 1984.
5. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 27 April 1984.
6. Ibid.
7. AKAHATA, 2 May 1984.
8. NEWSWEEK, 30 April 1984.
9. Ibid.
10. THE WASHINGTON POST, 28 April 1984.
11. Ibid., 22 April 1984; 4 May 1984.
12. THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 25 April 1984.
13. THE WASHINGTON POST, 8 May 1984.
14. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 4 May 1984.
15. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 7 May 1984.
16. NEWSWEEK, 30 April 1984.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1984

CSO: 1803/1a-F

DEBATES ON NATO MILITARY DOCTRINE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDELOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 84 (signed to press 17 Jul 84) pp 27-39

[Article by V. S. Shein]

[Text] The specific nature of current world affairs is influenced largely by the militarist policy line of the United States. Describing this line, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium K. U. Chernenko stressed that "the last few years have been marked by the dramatic intensification of the policy of the most aggressive forces of American imperialism--a policy of overt militarism, claims to world supremacy, the resistance of progress and the violation of people's rights and freedom."¹ These are precisely the aims of Washington's activity in the North Atlantic Bloc and its unconcealed attempts to make the United States militarily superior to the USSR and NATO superior to the Warsaw Pact.

This line was reaffirmed at an anniversary session of the NATO council in the American capital at the end of May this year. It was timed to coincide with the 35th anniversary of this military-political group. The final documents of the session do not envisage any kind of departure from the previous policy of reliance on military strength, the maximum buildup of this strength and the authoritarian treatment of other states.

In connection with this, Soviet leaders authorized TASS to announce that "people in the Soviet Union regard the results of the NATO council session in Washington as evidence of this bloc's intentions to continue adhering to a militarist line."

The White House attaches great significance to the deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles on the European continent and to the buildup of conventional weapons, including the development and manufacture of long-range and highly accurate weapons.

In addition to various military programs, both completed and ongoing, questions about the bloc's current military doctrine are matters of constant concern to the leaders of NATO countries and many experts. Now that the American leadership has placed strong emphasis on the factor of force and on anti-Sovietism,

it is taking every opportunity to stress that NATO military preparations and doctrine also have a political purpose, obviously in the hope of convincing its partners of the need to augment their potential to exert pressure on the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries.

Two Approaches to "Flexible Response"

The current debates in the West on military strategy and policy have focused on certain problems, many of which arose in the relations between the United States and its NATO allies almost two decades ago, including problems connected with the adoption of the North Atlantic Bloc's current military doctrine in 1967. At that time, "flexible response" replaced the doctrine of "massive retaliation," which had envisaged the escalation of virtually any conflict in Europe to the level of nuclear war and the delivery of massive strikes against Soviet territory by American strategic forces. The difference between the new doctrine and the previous one was that it retained the emphasis on the full-scale use of U.S. strategic forces against the Soviet Union but it also envisaged the possibility of other, more "limited" varieties of combat.

The main elements of the "flexible response" doctrine were recorded in a document of the NATO military committee, "MC 14/3," containing several demands, some of which were considered to be compulsory. For example, the NATO countries were expected to maintain "adequate" ground, air and naval forces in a high state of readiness to secure their operations during the stage of so-called direct defense, envisaging the possible use of nuclear weapons by bloc members but emphasizing the maintenance of adequate conventional forces. The document then envisaged a stage of projected escalation, presupposing the delivery of nuclear strikes against Warsaw Pact countries; the scales, intensity and duration of this stage were not precisely stipulated. This stage would be followed by a "general nuclear response," a term NATO circles use to signify extensive nuclear strikes against targets in Eastern Europe and the most important military installations in the USSR, all the way to the Urals; U.S. strategic forces would be the main instrument of this "response." Furthermore the West did not deny the extreme possibility of the massive use of strategic weapons against the population and economic potential of the Soviet Union.²

The actual implementation of the provisions of the "flexible response" doctrine would be the job of the NATO "triad," made up of conventional forces, intended for combat on so-called advance frontiers; tactical nuclear forces, intended to support "conventional defense" and to create the threat of escalation to the point of nuclear world war; the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and Great Britain, designed to support the entire Western strategy (the national nuclear forces and other elements of the military potential of France, which has been moving toward obvious convergence with NATO in recent years, are indisputably taken into account on the West's side in Atlantic military planning).

Political and military leaders in the NATO states invariable stress the close interrelationship of all three elements of the "triad." In accordance with

NATO theories, it is precisely this interrelationship that would secure the possibility of accomplishing "flexible response," the possibility of escalation from a conventional conflict to a conflict involving tactical nuclear weapons and, eventually, U.S. strategic systems--that is, the theoretical possibility of the American "nuclear guarantees" promised to the West European countries.

The doctrine of "flexible response" reflected a compromise between supporters of two mutually exclusive approaches. The West European countries agreed to "flexible response" because this doctrine, in their interpretation, included Washington's obligation to use its own strategic forces during a specific stage in the "interest" of the NATO allies, which had always underscored the primary significance of this provision. It is obvious that the West European variety of "flexible response" did not differ much from the previous military doctrine. As English researcher S. Lunn noted, "for many Europeans, the adoption of 'flexible response' represented the continuation of the doctrine of 'massive retaliation' under another name."³

The second approach, reflected in the American interpretation of "flexible response," envisaged concentration on one of the United States' main long-term goals in NATO--the creation of substantial conventional armed forces, which would be capable of conducting active offensive military operations against the Warsaw Pact states for a long time without the use of American strategic forces, which would inevitably result in a retaliatory nuclear strike against the United States. The vague original wording of the doctrine, in the opinion of American strategists, allowed West Europeans to interpret "flexible response" as a doctrine presupposing a brief phase of conventional war, while the Americans allegedly wanted to create the potential to secure "continuous non-nuclear defense."⁴ In fact, however, the United States always planned to use nuclear weapons for the attainment of specific military objectives.

In Washington's opinion, the position taken by Western Europe, envisaging American nuclear responses to any conflict on the European continent, had several major drawbacks. The main one was the threat that the conflict could spread directly to the United States. This, as American military expert R. Sinreich stressed, would mean that the United States would "take the risk of thermonuclear war with the Soviet Union over something that might actually have begun as an insignificant confrontation."⁵ For this reason and several others, the prevailing opinion among U.S. military and political leaders was that Western Europe needed strong conventional potential.

West European ruling circles regarded this U.S. position with suspicion. Representatives of some West European countries stressed that the very existence of sizable conventional forces would minimize the reliability of the American "nuclear umbrella" and simultaneously create the prospect of broad-scale "non-nuclear" war on the European continent. During heated debates in NATO, a compromise between the United States and Western Europe was made possible largely by the deliberate vagueness of the doctrine of "flexible response,"⁶ particularly the interpretation according to which any confrontation, even the most insignificant, could grow into nuclear world war but would make this course of events inevitable.

The American and West European disagreements with regard to the role of strategic weapons and conventional armed forces helped to make tactical nuclear weapons the focus of NATO attention at the end of the 1960's. The West European countries viewed the doctrine of "flexible response" as confirmation of the role of tactical nuclear weapons as, in the words of American researcher W. Hahn, "a connecting link in the chain of escalation to the ultimate use of strategic nuclear weapons."⁷ At that time the American allies would not agree to a significant increase in allocations for the reinforcement of conventional armed forces, insisting that pushing the "starter button" of the escalation machinery should be the main function, if not the only one, of NATO tactical nuclear weapons. The "mutual understanding" reached by the United States and its partners on tactical nuclear weapons as a component of NATO military potential was part of the general compromise which temporarily coordinated, but did not completely reconcile, the interests and approaches of the two sides.

The conflicts between Washington and Western Europe over NATO military doctrine, connected with their differing approaches to the nuclear and non-nuclear components of this doctrine, were not resolved and continued to grow more severe throughout the past decade. A distinctive feature of the present situation is that the entire group of these conflicts came to the surface during the debates aroused in the NATO countries by the NATO decision on medium-range missiles.

The content of the debates testifies that the positions of the "opponents" have essentially changed very little over the past decade and a half. The United States is even more convinced of the need to "localize" a potential conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Western Europe is more unanimous than before in its criticism of "flexible response" as a doctrine of "limited war," virtually any variety of which would be catastrophic for Western Europe.

The opinion that changes in the international political and strategic situation are eroding the American-West European compromise has been expressed with increasing frequency during these debates. For example, this has become an almost constant theme of statements by H. Kissinger, who recently reaffirmed the "fatal weakness" of Western military doctrine and the "urgent need" for its "quick and serious revision."⁸ He has been supported by several other influential Americans, who have noted the "ineffectiveness" of the "flexible response" doctrine due to the "inadequacy" of NATO non-nuclear potential (prior to the adoption of the "double decision" on the medium-range missiles, the emphasis was on the "inadequacy" of Western nuclear forces in the European theater).

Many political and military leaders and researchers in Western Europe have criticized the doctrine. "The military component of the alliance," French political scientist P. Lelouche remarked, "mainly the American nuclear guarantee in the form of the 'flexible response' doctrine, ... is no longer effective or reliable."⁹ The British Atlantic Committee, headed by Lord Cameron, called the NATO doctrine "unrealistic nonsense."¹⁰ Prominent West German Social Democrat H. Gunther has appealed for a return to the doctrine of

"massive retaliation." As for the present FRG Government, it has expressed its willingness to "study new strategic and operational models," although it anticipates the "improvement and adaptation" of current strategy, and not a departure from it.¹¹

Far from all of the Westerners who are criticizing the doctrine of "flexible response," however, are openly proposing its partial or complete replacement with something else. In most cases, they are demanding that the reliability of the doctrine be restored through the considerable reinforcement of NATO military potential. This indicative fact testifies that certain groups in the NATO countries, especially the United States, are actively using the military debates to justify and escalate the arms race. This is being accompanied by the revision of military theories to intensify their aggressive thrust and secure it with the latest weapons systems and military equipment.

The Factor of Strategic Parity

The American position with regard to the effects of strategic parity on U.S. military and political cooperation with Western Europe is a vivid example of the way in which Washington is manipulating the debates on NATO military doctrine to influence the scales and nature of militarist preparations within the bloc. In essence, this position is that the loss of strategic superiority by the United States dealt a perceptible blow to the system of interrelations within the NATO framework and had a negative effect on the doctrine of "flexible response."

This is based on the oversimplification that the factor of strategic parity is undermining Western military doctrine. The doctrine itself, however, is largely a product of the situation which arose when American strategic superiority began to decline and U.S. territory turned out to be within reach of a retaliatory nuclear strike.

The United States' allies viewed parity as the natural result of tendencies taking shape over several years, and as a fact less important in the technical context than the development of the first ICBM's in the USSR.

After the start of the Nixon Administration, however, the issue of strategic parity and its relationship to the American "nuclear guarantees" promised to NATO allies became the focus of trans-Atlantic debates. This was partly a result of the first stage of the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks. The West European countries took a natural interest in these talks because one of the topics of discussion was the American systems which constituted one of the three components of NATO military potential. This interest and the increasing speculation with regard to the buildup of Soviet strategic forces, however, were apparently not the only reasons why the issue of strategic parity was constantly debated in the United States and Western Europe throughout the past decade.

A look at the development of these debates indicates that they were usually initiated by Washington. The allegation that strategic parity was the North Atlantic Bloc's main problem began to figure in many speeches by American

members of ruling circles, politicians and specialists in the 1970's. Western Europe was informed almost openly that it should not rely too much on the American "nuclear umbrella" and that it would be absurd to base Western strategy, as H. Kissinger later stressed, "on the reliability of the threat of mutual suicide."¹²

American ruling circles frequently attempted the artificial exaggeration of the significance of the strategic parity factor in American-West European relations within the NATO framework by misrepresenting its effect on bloc military doctrine. Washington made active use of the situation of parity to exert pressure on its allies. The attempts of various American officials to direct their attention to the "debilitating" effect of parity on "flexible response" were primarily intended to convince the West European countries of the increasing importance of the particular aspects of this doctrine which were not directly related to the use of strategic weapons. American foreign policy and military strategists said that NATO was "under-armed" and that this was supposedly destabilizing the situation. According to them, this would not have happened if the United States still possessed clear nuclear superiority.

In this way, the U.S. leaders use the criticism of the doctrine of "flexible response," including criticism connected with parity, to promote various programs for the buildup of NATO military potential. The criticism itself was largely designed to promote the reordering of military priorities in bloc countries according to Washington's wishes, and to convince the allies of the need for the maximum reinforcement of the supposedly inadequate components of the NATO "triad." The Americans made a statement which later became one of the main elements of U.S. policy in NATO--a statement about the disintegration of the "triad" and about the general lack of correspondence between bloc military doctrine and the West's ability to implement it with the aid of existing armed forces.¹³

The members of the alliance were convinced of the need to secure the strength and reliability of the NATO "triad" under the conditions of the new Soviet-U.S. strategic balance. As Washington stressed, this would necessitate the reinforcement and modernization of each component, but primarily conventional forces. The emphasis on the "new role" of conventional weapons became one of the distinctive features of the American interpretation of "flexible response" at the beginning of the 1970's.

American ruling circles pretended to make a number of "concessions" in exchange for the West European countries' consent to participate more in NATO military preparations. The main one was the reaffirmation of the essentially discredited American "nuclear guarantees." To make these moves seem particularly important, Washington first organized a campaign to frighten its NATO partners with a show of exaggerated skepticism about the reliability of its own "nuclear umbrella." It implied to the West European allies that the United States was on the verge of having to give up its strategic obligations now that it had lost its nuclear superiority to the USSR.

After the United States was convinced that Western Europe "realized the full gravity" of the situation and had taken a more active stand on the buildup of

NATO non-nuclear potential, Washington announced that it had supposedly found a solution to the problem. At the beginning of 1974 J. Schlesinger, then U.S. secretary of defense, introduced the concept of "limited strategic nuclear war."

It is particularly significant that when U.S. ruling circles depicted the "Schlesinger doctrine" as a contribution to the consolidation of the North Atlantic Bloc and a concession to Western Europe, they were using it to justify and camouflage their own militarist ambitions. It was precisely this doctrine that laid the foundation for the actual reorganization of the American strategic arsenal, later embodied in the program for the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine system, the MX missile and various types of cruise missiles. It was under the "collective banner" of NATO and supposedly in the interest of its allies that Washington began to intensify its efforts to restore its strategic superiority, to develop counterforce weapon systems and to draw up military plans for their use. Presidential directive No 59, signed by J. Carter, was validated primarily by the entrance of the NATO partners. Even the campaign over the notorious "window of vulnerability" of the American ICBM's was portrayed as proof of the U.S. leadership's efforts to heighten the reliability of American strategic forces as a means of implementing Washington's "nuclear guarantees."

The Central Link of the NATO "Triad"

The U.S. position on the production and deployment of various tactical nuclear weapons and their role in NATO military doctrine is based primarily on Washington's own long-range interests. Many Western researchers who analyze NATO military policy underscore the artificial nature of the "consensus" within the bloc framework, which only camouflage, but did not eliminate, the serious disagreements between the United States and the West European countries.

The members of the North Atlantic Alliance assumed, however, that unconcealed criticism of this aspect of NATO doctrine for the purpose of its revision would weaken the American-West European compromise: Any revision in the interest of one side would unavoidably put the other in a worse position. This is why, for example, many people had a negative reaction a decade later to H. Kissinger's statement of September 1979 at a conference on "NATO in the Coming 30 Years," where he frankly excluded the possibility of the use of U.S. strategic forces in the interests of the bloc and denied the role of tactical nuclear weapons as a means of putting American "nuclear guarantees" in action--that is, he "separated" U.S. strategic potential from nuclear weapons in the European theater. According to specialists, his remarks did not contain anything new, but they did hurt the "consensus" between the United States and Western Europe, which had given the latter a chance to interpret "flexible response" as a doctrine envisaging the offer of an American "nuclear umbrella."

On the one hand, the West European NATO countries wanted tactical nuclear weapons to be used in the early stages of a conflict, but on the other they stressed the need to minimize the destructive effects of this. "Our allies' actual aim," Kissinger wrote, "consisted in obtaining a U.S. promise of the

early use of strategic nuclear weapons, which would mean a Soviet-American nuclear war fought over their heads. It was this that was unacceptable to American policymakers."¹⁴

Although the West Europeans insisted that tactical nuclear weapons should be used as a "starter button," they also regarded these weapons as a means of exerting political pressure on the socialist states and of intimidating them with the threat of a strategic conflict, and they used the fact of their deployment to justify their own "passivity" in the buildup of their conventional potential.

The United States' NATO partners, American political scientist W. Hyland remarked, obviously wanted any initial use of nuclear weapons by NATO members to be consigned to a "show of strength."¹⁵ In accordance with this idea, the next step in the event of continued conflict would be an immediate strike against the USSR by U.S. strategic nuclear forces. The use of tactical nuclear weapons in this context was supposed to be a strategic signal, and not a means of waging war. Specifically, they wanted a small quantity of tactical nuclear munitions to be used as a warning that the situation "is going out of control."

As high-placed military leaders in the last four American administrations have asserted, disagreements between allies kept the "pre-emptive" nuclear strike from becoming a part of NATO strategy.¹⁶ The temporary compromise on this matter allowed for "shows of strength" and the "operational" use of tactical nuclear weapons. This did not eliminate the American-West European disagreements because it was clear that any variation of even the use of nuclear weapons for a "show of strength" would create the prospect of the escalation of the conflict to the point of an exchange of strategic nuclear strikes.

In fall 1981 the possibility of using weapons for a "show of strength" aroused considerable attention in the United States and Western Europe in connection with a statement by A. Haigh, who was then the secretary of state. He told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "emergency plans for the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons are part of the NATO doctrine." The next day this statement was denied by Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, who stressed that the idea of the "pre-emptive" strike was only a "proposal" and that there was "no specific NATO military plan" envisaging this kind of strike.

The conflict which broke out in the Reagan Administration in connection with the "show-of-strength" strike reaffirmed the ambiguous position of U.S. ruling circles on matters of Western nuclear strategy. Washington was apparently worried that the allies viewed this kind of strike as an indirect way of putting U.S. strategic "guarantees" in action and it therefore questioned the feasibility of the use of nuclear weapons for this purpose.

Washington's NATO partners, however, disagree. For example, according to former Defense Minister G. Leber and other prominent West German political and military leaders, the North Atlantic Bloc could decide on the "limited" use of nuclear weapons: "The use of low-power munitions in small quantities would be possible, or even a simple warning shot."¹⁷

Some Western researchers have noted, however, that the position of the American NATO allies has undergone serious changes in recent years. In particular, under the influence of the futile attempts to restore U.S. strategic superiority and in light of the West's loss of superiority on lower levels of the nuclear balance, the West European attitude toward tactical nuclear weapons is also changing. Now that the use of these weapons as a "starter button" is growing increasingly unrealistic, Western Europe is losing interest in them.

Under U.S. pressure, however, the NATO nuclear arsenal is undergoing quantitative growth and qualitative improvement, accompanied by the partial reduction of outdated and unsuitable systems. The chief criterion of modernization undertakings has become the suitability of nuclear weapons in actual combat situations in the European theater. The focus of attention is the deployment of new American medium-range systems, whose key characteristic, in the words of English expert L. Friedman, is the ability to reach targets on Soviet territory, an ability absent in previous systems.¹⁸

In the case of the medium-range missiles, the doctrine of "flexible response" again served as the point of departure for American initiatives, as Brookings Institution researcher D. Schwartz pointed out.¹⁹ The NATO decision on the deployment of the new missiles was adopted in December 1979 on the traditional pretext of "saving" this doctrine, which is now supposedly being threatened by the new Soviet SS-20 missile and the "change in the Eurostrategic situation that has been generally unfavorable for the West."

In fact, however, Washington was concerned less about the reliability of "flexible response" than about the buildup of NATO nuclear potential to make NATO superior to the Warsaw Pact.

As for the speculation surrounding Western doctrine, it was supposed to prove the inefficacy of U.S. "nuclear guarantees" without the "re-arming" of the North Atlantic Bloc with new American nuclear missiles. As more and more West Europeans are now realizing, however, the actual deployment of these systems will not strengthen the "guarantees," but will separate the United States from its allies when Washington puts the emphasis on nuclear war confined to Europe.²⁰ To a considerable extent, this approach was the reason for the destructive U.S. line at the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, which ultimately led to their cessation.

The Reagan Administration's "Contribution"

The distinctive feature of Washington policy under the current administration is that the efforts to secure nuclear superiority have been supplemented by much more vigorous efforts than in the past to establish "reliable conventional defense" in several regions, primarily Western Europe. After the American medium-range missiles began to be deployed in Europe, there was a noticeable change in emphasis in the debates on aspects of NATO military strategy. Now these aspects are generally discussed in conjunction with promising and practical ways of strengthening NATO non-nuclear potential. For example, U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz has listed this among the matters of "primary importance."²¹

The Reagan Administration's behavior in this area contains several traditional elements. It invariably stresses the need to accelerate the work on the long-range NATO military program adopted in May 1978, to systematically increase the real military expenditures of members by a minimum of 3 percent, and so forth.

On the other hand, there are also some new elements. American political and military leaders have officially stated and defended the objective of limiting NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons by raising the "nuclear threshold" (that is, by emphasizing the protracted use of only conventional forces in the event of a conflict in Europe). As for the key NATO objective of using nuclear weapons first, which aroused fierce disagreement in the West, actual promises have been made to replace it with the "comforting" concept of no first use of nuclear weapons during the early stages of a European war, but only on the condition of a substantial buildup of NATO non-nuclear potential. The emphasis on "non-nuclear defense," which is camouflaging the efforts to simultaneously build up all components, including nuclear ones, of the North Atlantic Bloc's armed forces is being portrayed as something just short of a panacea for the United States' allies and is being advertised as a supposedly realistic means of safeguarding their security. Exactly what does this mean?

Plans call for the broad-scale rearming of NATO armies with the latest and best weapon systems of the new generation, manufactured with a view to the latest technical achievements and with the aim of using them to achieve superiority on the non-nuclear level of the East-West military balance. According to American and NATO strategists, this will mean that armies will be equipped with non-nuclear ballistic and cruise missiles, new aircraft, other offensive systems and perfected means of combat support.

The authors of several publications which have had extensive repercussions in the NATO states in the last year or two have admitted that NATO agencies have focused their attention on conventional systems which are comparable to nuclear weapons in terms of destructive force and other characteristics and which are intended to replace some of the "obsolete and outdated" nuclear systems. For example, the authors of the controversial report "Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe. Proposals for the 1980's,"²² published in the United States by more than 50 American and Western European authorities (many of whom were once prominent government and military leaders), frankly state that conventional systems would be designed to destroy the same targets as today's nuclear munitions, and that the conventional weapons based on the new technology would be "almost as effective" as medium-range or battlefield nuclear weapons, and frequently more "economical."

This report, numerous other Western documents and statements by officials indicate that the new generation of conventional weapons should constitute powerful combat potential for offensive operations against the socialist countries of the Warsaw Pact and for strikes at targets deep within the territory of these countries, including airports, railroad junctions, troop concentrations, munition depots, administrative and communications networks, elements of the ABM system.... After the "enemy" has been weakened by these strikes, attacks by military units will be launched.

It is not difficult to see that these ideas are identical to the official American doctrine of air and land battles, which also emphasizes strikes deep within the territory of socialist states. This doctrine's projected buildup of NATO non-nuclear potential is also envisaged in the 1982 "Rogers plan"--named after the American general who is the supreme allied commander of NATO forces in Western Europe. This plan concentrates on the creation of all-purpose forces capable of fighting a protracted war with conventional weapons against the Warsaw Pact countries and on the augmentation of the offensive capabilities of Western armies. B. Rogers stated that an annual increase of 4 percent in the military budgets of NATO countries would be enough to implement his plan, which supposedly makes the prospect of the use of nuclear weapons more distant.

Washington and some of its allies have alleged that NATO is in an unfavorable position in the non-nuclear sphere. One of their arguments was used repeatedly in the past to substantiate the buildup of military preparations. This is the allegation that current NATO military doctrine will inevitably be undermined unless steps are taken to strengthen the West's non-nuclear potential in Europe (during previous stages references were made to U.S. strategic forces or the nuclear forces of the European theater). In this way, militarist groups in the NATO countries, especially the United States, are again manipulating the debates on Western military doctrine to escalate the arms race--in this case, the non-nuclear race.

In connection with the "reassessment" of the role of nuclear and conventional weapons in NATO military doctrine, people in the West are debating the appeal to consider a "NATO declaration on no first use of nuclear weapons," an appeal made in an article by R. McNamara, M. Bundy, G. Smith and G. Kennan, published in FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2 years ago.²³ The publication of this article, written by prominent men who had previously been directly involved in U.S. foreign and military policymaking, was sometimes interpreted as evidence that official Washington circles were more inclined to revise some aspects of NATO military doctrine, including less reliance on the nuclear factor. There are not sufficient grounds, however, for this conclusion.

As for the appeal by R. McNamara and his co-authors, it did not refer to an unconditional refusal to use nuclear weapons first, but actually to the same idea of no first use during the early stages of the conflict, presupposing a dramatic buildup of NATO non-nuclear potential. According to American researcher J. Steinbruner, a more deep-seated aim of this idea consists in securing "internal structural changes in bloc military preparations."²⁴ In this context, the initiative of R. McNamara and the others is completely consistent with the efforts to strengthen conventional NATO potential on the pretext of raising the "nuclear threshold."

When we compare the position of the authors of this article, who do not propose the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Western Europe (with the exception of outdated munitions) and who admit that the possibility of their use will exist as long as nuclear weapons exist, with the position of, for example, Gen B. Rogers, it is easy to see that they coincide almost completely.

The appeal for a higher "nuclear threshold" can essentially be translated into an emphasis on the buildup of non-nuclear NATO potential with the simultaneous reinforcement of strategic and European nuclear forces (obviously, neither side objects to the implementation of U.S. strategic programs or the deployment of medium-range missiles in Western Europe). This is precisely the essence of the Atlantic policy line of the current U.S. leadership, which is completely consistent with the long-range desire of American ruling circles to force the NATO allies to "pay" for Washington's "nuclear guarantees."

One feature which was not present in previous years is that West European countries are being urged to pursue broad-scale rearming with consideration for not only the latest military and technical achievements, but also the offensive military theories resting on the capabilities of the new generation of combat equipment. Under the cover of appeals for a "higher nuclear threshold," plans are being carried out which will make the start of an armed conflict more, and not less, probable and will, in NATO's terminology, lower the "threshold" of European war.

The new systems of non-nuclear weapons and the offensive theories about their use on enemy territory (both are now in the engineering stage in the United States and NATO) are helping to intensify the belligerence and danger of the Atlantic military doctrine. They are resulting in the appearance of an updated version of this doctrine, envisaging the use of nuclear weapons and comparable conventional weapons of the new generation in a first strike against the Warsaw Pact countries. American political analyst S. Huntington has proposed an end to hypocrisy, stating that, for example, a non-nuclear strike against Eastern Europe at the very beginning of a conflict would correspond just as much to the "creed" of the North Atlantic Alliance as the kind of nuclear offensive envisaged in the concept of the first use of tactical and even strategic nuclear weapons.²⁵ Furthermore, even Western military experts have repeatedly stressed that the effectiveness of new conventional systems will depend on their early use in military operations and on the destruction of targets within the territory of Warsaw Pact states before the armed forces of the two sides come into contact.

According to NATO's offensive logic, the use of non-nuclear weapons against targets deep within the socialist states would be more efficient, particularly in the creation of more favorable conditions for subsequent "successful development." From this standpoint, the Western idea of no first use of nuclear weapons during the early stages of a conflict is largely equivalent to the policy of using non-nuclear weapons during these stages with similar projected results.

Although the key objectives pertaining to the buildup of non-nuclear potential were actually approved by NATO administrative bodies in December 1982 and were then reaffirmed at a meeting of the NATO leadership in May 1984 and at other times, most of the United States' allies are not particularly enthusiastic about the U.S. position they reflect. Many of them have specifically stressed the impossibility of increasing their military spending on the projected scales. There is also reason for broader dissatisfaction on the

part of West European NATO members sensitive to the political aspects of the U.S. line (its obvious anti-Sovietism) and the state of affairs in trans-Atlantic military-industrial cooperation, which has turned into a source of increasingly serious problems.

The position of the American leadership in this area consists, first of all, in exerting maximum pressure on the NATO partners (intimidating them with the cancellation of "nuclear guarantees," the withdrawal of American troops and, in general, "reorientation" toward non-European regions); secondly, in exploiting the widespread antinuclear feelings in Western Europe as much as possible; thirdly, in imposing U.S. ideas about the situation in the world, in Europe and in East-West relations on the allies (the achievement of a consensus "on the nature and scales of the threat" posed by the USSR); fourthly, in encouraging cooperation within Western Europe in the sphere of arms production; fifthly, in convincing the FRG and other West European countries that their acceptance of American terms will give them access to U.S. scientific and technical achievements through interaction in the rearming of the North Atlantic Bloc.

In general, the U.S. efforts to buildup NATO non-nuclear potential do not indicate any U.S. intention to replace the current Western military doctrine with its central emphasis on the use of nuclear weapons against the socialist states with the doctrine of "conventional war." Nuclear potential is still an important part of NATO doctrine. The slight reduction in the number of American nuclear munitions in Western Europe, envisaged in the recent decision of bloc members, will not raise the "nuclear threshold": The replacement of outdated weapons even with a smaller quantity of new "usable" systems will lower, and not raise, the "nuclear threshold" (this is one of the actual results of the deployment of the new American medium-range missiles in a number of West European countries). Besides this, there are plans for the combined use of nuclear and conventional weapons and for the rapid transfer of neutron bombs and other nuclear munitions from the United States to Western Europe, which theoretically gives Washington the ability to manipulate the "nuclear threshold" by arbitrarily lowering it if, for example, American servicemen assigned to NATO contingents should have to be used in crises outside Europe.

This is the actual Reagan Administration policy which has aroused increasing irritation in Western Europe with its militarism. People there have frequently noted the illusory nature of the attempts to make NATO militarily superior to the Warsaw Pact, including American nuclear superiority to the USSR. More and more West Europeans now believe that the satisfactory solution to their security problems does not lie in the sphere of the arms race but in economic and political cooperation by various states.

When USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, spoke at a breakfast during the Moscow visit of FRG Vice Chancellor and Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs H. D. Genscher, he said: "Now we are hearing appeals to return to Geneva, resume the dialogue and build a bridge between East and West, as if nothing in particular had happened. Obviously, a bridge should be built between East and West, and the stronger

the better. But nuclear missiles are unfit to support this kind of bridge. This will not be a bridge to trust and cooperation, to mutual understanding and peace. We suggest that the bridge be fortified on a different basis, on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence and the firm standards of interrelations, especially between nuclear powers, of which Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko spoke so logically on behalf of our party and state."²⁶ This is the position of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

FOOTNOTES

1. KOMMUNIST, No 4, 1984, p 10.
2. "The SALT II Treaty. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate," pt 4, Wash., 1979, pp 264-274.
3. "The Modernization of NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces," Wash., 1981, pp 11-12.
4. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1982, p 1125.
5. ORBIS, Summer 1975, p 464.
6. "Challenges for U.S. National Security. Nuclear Strategy Issues for the 80's," N.Y., 1982, p 136.
7. "Atlantic Community in Crisis," N.Y., 1979, p 75.
8. TIME, 5 March 1984, p 20.
9. "The Atlantic Alliance and Its Critics," ed. by R. Tucker and L. Wrigley, N.Y., 1983, p 130.
10. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 11 March 1984.
11. "White Paper 1983, The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany," Bonn, 1983, pp 153, 154.
12. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn 1979, p 7.
13. See, for example, S. Nunn, "MBFR/TNF Modernization," Wash., 1979.
14. H. Kissinger, "White House Years," Boston-Toronto, 1979, p 218.
15. "Nuclear Weapons in Europe," N.Y., Council on Foreign Relations, 1984, p 16.
16. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 8 November 1981.
17. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1982, p 1161.

18. "Nuclear Weapons in Europe," p 47.
19. D. Schwartz, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas," Wash., 1983, p 248.
20. "Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question," ed. by J. Steinbruner and L. Sigal, Wash., 1983, pp 152-153.
21. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 15 May 1984.
22. "Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe. Proposals for the 80's. Report of the European Security Study," N.Y., 1983.
23. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1982, pp 753-768.
24. "Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question," pp 2-3.
25. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Winter 1983/84, p 32.
26. PRAVDA, 22 May 1984.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1984

8588

CSO: 1803/1

GROMYKO ROLE IN CREATION OF UN STRESSED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 84 (signed to press 17 Jul 84) pp 66-79

[Article by V. M. Berezhev: "The Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the USSR's Struggle for the Unity of the Great Powers"]

[Text] The conference of representatives of the USSR, United States and Great Britain in Dumbarton Oaks 40 years ago--21 August - 28 September 1944--was an important event in the diplomatic history of World War II. The result of this work--the "basic document," as it was called at that time--was the first actual step in the creation of a new postwar worldwide security organization.

Plans for Postwar Construction

The task facing those who gathered in Dumbarton Oaks, New York, was not an easy one. The bloodiest war mankind had ever experienced was in its fifth year. And although there had already been an obvious reversal in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition by August 1944, arduous battles still lay ahead, hundreds of thousands of soldiers still had to give up their lives for the sake of victory, and the people of many countries were still being tormented by fascist oppression.

The horrors and deprivations of the war, the incredible destruction and the colossal human losses convinced people that this kind of catastrophe must never happen again. Millions of people were firmly convinced of the need to create a system of international relations securing a strong and lasting peace. The fact that the anti-Hitler coalition united powers with differing social systems, however, created additional difficulties. All of this made the drafting of the principles of the new organization a particularly crucial task.

The sad experience of the League of Nations, which demonstrated a total inability to put an end to fascist aggression and had actually ceased to exist by the beginning of World War II, was still current at that time. The impotence of the League of Nations and its failure to stop the flagrant acts of aggression committed by fascist states dictated the need for an absolutely new approach to the matter of postwar construction.

The Soviet Government advocated the creation of an organization capable of effectively safeguarding international security and simultaneously preventing acts of aggression. As early as 4 December 1941, when Hitler's troops stood at the gates of Moscow, this idea was expressed in the first intergovernmental document of the war years--the "Declaration of the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the Republic of Poland on Friendship and Mutual Assistance." The document said that a strong and just peace could only be secured "by the new organization of international relations, based on the unification of the democratic countries in a strong alliance."¹ The next step in this direction was the declaration adopted on 1 January 1942 by 26 states calling themselves the "united nations." The war was still at its height when the USSR, United States and Great Britain began to investigate matters of postwar regulation. A commission on peace treaties and postwar construction was created in the Soviet Union in September 1943, made up of prominent Soviet government and political leaders. It was supposed to draft specific proposals.²

As for the United States and England, they originally wanted the new security organization to be a copy of the League of Nations. When British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden arrived in Washington for consultations with American leaders, he told Soviet Ambassador M. M. Litvinov that Washington and London had "common views on the creation of a postwar organization like the earlier League of Nations."³

The Declaration of the Four Powers

In October 1943 at the Moscow conference of the foreign ministers of the USSR, United States and Great Britain, the Soviet delegation proposed the "creation of a commission, made up of representatives of Great Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, for the preliminary negotiation of matters connected with the establishment of an international organization."⁴ The Soviet proposal was adopted. This marked the beginning of more intensive preparations for the drafting of the new international organization's basic document.

Matters related to postwar construction were discussed in detail at the Moscow conference. The "Declaration of Four States on International Security" was signed (China signed it along with the three participants in the Moscow conference). It stipulated the need for coordinated action by the great powers as an essential condition for the rapid defeat of the aggressors and a quicker and more orderly transition from war to peace. Furthermore, it stated that peace should be secured with a minimum of human resources and economic resources for weapons. The signatories declared their determination to work together after the enemy had been defeated for the organization and maintenance of peace and security. The declaration went on to say that, "in postwar politics, the powers will not use military means to settle disputes without mutual consultations" and acknowledged the need "to quickly establish an international organization for the maintenance of world peace and security, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peaceful states and offering membership to all such states--large and small."⁵

While the Moscow conference was in session, the head of the Soviet Government, I. V. Stalin, met with U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull twice; once in Stalin's office in the Kremlin and once in the Yekaterinin Hall of the Kremlin Palace at a dinner marking the end of the conference. I was the interpreter at these meetings. I remember the conviction with which the U.S. secretary of state spoke of the importance of reaching an agreement on postwar construction.

In a conversation on 25 October, Hull mentioned the then projected conference of the leaders of these powers and said that "this kind of meeting could result in the unity of the three great powers, which would be promoted by their cooperation in the war and the development of their relations in the postwar period." The secretary of state went on to say, "if we wait until the end of the war to formulate and negotiate the bases of the postwar international program, people in all of the democratic countries will disperse in different directions, their differences will be intensified, and various elements and social groups, and even some individuals, will take advantage of this. Under these conditions, it will be extremely difficult, at least for the United States, to carry out the necessary postwar program and unite the forces needed for its maintenance. The situation now is totally different, and if any fairly high-placed U.S. official should now oppose the postwar program, he would immediately be discredited and ignored."

At the dinner in the Kremlin Palace on 30 October 1944, Hull again spoke of the importance of postwar cooperation. "The Moscow conference was successful," he said, "because your country and your people took a resolute step toward cooperation with Great Britain and the United States in an international program for the future, based on mutual effort."⁶ Stalin replied that he was wholly in favor of a broad program of international cooperation--military, political and economic--in the interests of peace. In this way, he evaded Hull's implication that Washington had almost convinced the USSR to join the work on the "program for the future."

In reality, the Roosevelt Administration had to oppose the Americans who felt that the military alliance with Moscow had been compulsory and did not want to allow any kind of cooperation with the Soviet Union in the postwar period. These groups were so influential that the White House could not ignore them. Hull was referring to them when he mentioned the "social groups" and "individuals" in the United States. The pressure of these elements had been felt since the invasion of the Soviet Union by Hitler's Germany and was perceptible throughout the existence of the anti-Hitler coalition. The need to consider the opinions of these influential groups forced President Roosevelt to engage in several maneuvers and take a contradictory, ambiguous stance. By 22 June 1941 this phenomenon had been pointed out by Soviet Ambassador K. A. Umanskiy. A telegram he sent to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs said that Roosevelt was facing a difficult choice. "The prospect of a German victory is unacceptable...but the prospect of our 'too' overwhelming victory and influence in Europe frightens him from the class standpoint. Roosevelt and his policy now consist entirely of zigzags between these contradictory positions, and there is still a great deal of class hatred for us in the United States. This makes a typical Rooseveltian compromise possible."⁷

Subsequent zigzags of this type and compromises were seen repeatedly in Roosevelt administration policy. However, Roosevelt was one of the Western leaders more inclined to take a realistic look at the world situation. He believed that the United States would have to give the Soviet Union some consideration during the war and after the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Analyzing Washington policy of that time, American researcher Daniel Yergin remarked in his book "Shattered Peace" that "one of the main premises of Roosevelt's position was that a realistic assessment of the strength of the Soviet Union and its sphere of interests was vitally necessary to the United States."⁸

Roosevelt was more aware than many other American politicians of the limits of U.S. capability and he realized that the Soviet Union was capable of defending its own interests. Nevertheless, Roosevelt's concept of cooperation with the USSR included the assumption that the United States would take the dominant position in the system of American-Soviet relations. Washington's approach to the drafting of a postwar program and its view of the role and nature of the new international security organization should also be examined in this context.

Obviously, all of this had an effect on the Dumbarton Oaks conference. The Western powers repeatedly tried to word certain passages of the charter of the future security organization in such a way as to secure the interests of the imperialist powers at the expense of other states belonging to the organization, especially the Soviet Union. The Soviet delegation had to display great persistence, determination and adherence to principle in these cases.

It is significant, however, that many prominent U.S. leaders of that time underscored the importance of American-Soviet cooperation in the postwar world. On 2 July 1943, A. A. Gromyko, the USSR charge d'affaires in the United States, reported on his meeting with Chairman Sol Bloom of the House Committee on International Relations of the U.S. Congress, who spoke of the "common interests of England, the USSR and the United States, the role of these countries in the postwar world and the need to strengthen U.S. cooperation with the Soviet Union."⁹

The Bomb Factor

A fairly intensive exchange of views on postwar construction took place when the leaders of the three great powers--I. V. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill--met in Tehran. During one conversation with the head of the Soviet Government, President Roosevelt made several comments about the structure and aims of the future international organization. The organization, he explained, "will be based on the principles of the united nations, and it will not be concerned with military matters. It should not resemble the League of Nations. It will consist of 35, or perhaps even 50, united nations and will make recommendations. The organization should not have any other authority than to make recommendations."

Answering questions, the President explained that, in addition to an executive committee, the organization would have "something like a police committee--that is, a committee of countries keeping the peace."¹⁰

Roosevelt returned to the idea of the "four policemen" several times. It initially appeared to be based on the equality of all four powers--the USSR, United States, England and China. But this was not the case. The work on the atom bomb (the so-called "Manhattan Project") was already in full swing in the United States. Washington ruling circles expected to use the bomb not only to end the war as quickly as possible, but also to secure the United States' dominant position in the postwar world. American General Leslie Groves, appointed the head of the project in 1942, stated his beliefs: "Within 2 weeks after I took charge of the project, I had no doubt that Russia was our enemy, and the Manhattan Project was carried out on that basis. I totally disagree with the many people in this country who regard Russia as a brave ally.... Of course, this was reported to the President."¹¹ And what happened? There is no evidence that the White House reprimanded General Groves. He retained his position until the work on the bomb was completed.

Let us recall the year of 1942: Hitler's troops advanced to the Volga, had reached the Caucasian foothills and were threatening the Grozny oilfields. At the cost of incredible effort and sacrifice, the Soviet people and their courageous Red Army stopped the enemy and started ridding their land of the fascist aggressors, thereby establishing the prerequisites for the rescue of the people of Europe from Nazi enslavement and for the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition. But in the minds of some high-level American officials, like General Groves, the enemy of the United States was the Soviet Union!

During the work on the atom bomb, some American politicians and some of the scientists involved in the Manhattan Project suggested that the efforts of the Americans and the English to keep this project a secret from their Soviet ally would create serious difficulties in relations between the powers belonging to the anti-Hitler coalition, particularly with regard to the plans for postwar construction. This matter was discussed several times in meetings and letters by Roosevelt and Churchill. At first Roosevelt did not want to be bound by any final decisions, but at the Quebec conference in August 1943 the President gave in to Churchill's demands and signed a joint agreement with him, in which the two sides pledged not to give a third party any information about the bomb "except by mutual consent."¹²

Soon afterward the two Western leaders made an even more definite statement. On 19 September 1944--that is, at the time of the Dumbarton Oaks conference--Roosevelt and Churchill signed a secret document at Hyde Park, the President's suburban home, in which they expressed distrust in world-renowned physicist Nils Bohr, who insisted that the United States and England share the information about the bomb with Moscow. The memorandum said that "Professor Bohr's activities should be investigated, and measures should be taken to prevent information leaks, especially to the Russians." This ultra-secret document, which was just recently declassified, went on to say: "The suggestion that the world be informed of the 'alloy' (the code name for the atom bomb--B. V.) for the purpose of an international agreement on its control and use is unacceptable. This matter should remain absolutely confidential."¹³

In essence, this meant that the monopoly on the atomic bomb would be used for political purposes, primarily as a means of pressuring the USSR.

Under these conditions, President Roosevelt's talk about the "four policemen" had definite undercurrents. Only two of the four "policemen"--the United States and England--would have a lethal atomic weapon. The Soviet Union and China were assigned a subordinate role.

Nevertheless, a statement was drafted in Tehran, in accordance with which a lasting peace would be secured only on the basis of an agreement by the three great powers--the USSR, United States and Great Britain. The Tehran declaration said: "As for peacetime, we are certain that our consensus will secure a strong peace."¹⁴

Soon afterward the sides agreed that preliminary, unofficial discussions by representatives of the three powers would begin on 21 August in Washington. Furthermore, the USSR, the United States and England would be represented during the first stage of discussions, and the United States, England and China would be represented during the second. This procedure was adopted because the Soviet Union was still not involved in the allied powers' war against Japan.

Three Memoranda

By the start of the Dumbarton Oaks conference, all of its participants had prepared specific proposals. The U.S. memorandum was submitted to the governments of the USSR and Great Britain on 18 July 1944. It covered a broad range of problems. The first section discussed the general nature of the organization and stressed that it "should be based on the principle of cooperation, freely agreed upon by sovereign and peaceful states." It also said that the main goals of the organization should be the maintenance of international security and peace and the promotion of the stable and favorable conditions needed for the existence of peaceful and friendly relations between nations.

The American draft went on to discuss the functions, rights and role of various bodies in detail: the general assembly, the executive council, the international court and others. Special sections dealt with the peaceful settlement of disputes, the determination of threats to peace or violations of the peace, the regulation of arms and armed forces, economic and social cooperation, territorial protectorates and the procedure for the creation and installation of the new organization.¹⁵

The government of Great Britain submitted its proposals on 22 July 1944. They were set forth in five separate memoranda, in which the new organization's sphere of activity, its nature, measures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the maintenance of peace, military aspects, the coordination of political and economic efforts on the international level and the method and procedure of establishing the world organization were described in detail. In essence, the English proposals stressed that the four powers (USSR, United States, Great Britain and China) should occupy a special position in the organization. They would be chiefly responsible for keeping the peace.¹⁶

The Soviet memorandum, submitted to the governments of the United States and England on 12 August 1944, singled out the following as the organization's

basic aims: 1. The maintenance of world peace and security and the institution of collective measures for the prevention of aggression and the organized suppression of aggressive actions for this purpose. 2. The peaceful resolution and elimination of international conflicts capable of violating the peace. 3. The adoption of any other measures related to the reinforcement of world peace and the development of friendly relations between nations. A council, made up of permanent members representing the USSR, United States, Great Britain, China and France, and some representatives of other countries, elected by the organization's general assembly for a term to be specified in the charter, would be chiefly responsible for the guarantee of world peace and security. Council decisions on matters pertaining to the prevention or suppression of aggression would have to be endorsed, according to the Soviet draft, by a majority on the condition of the unanimity of all permanent council members, and decisions of an organizational nature would be passed by a simple majority.

The USSR memorandum stressed that the discussion during the first stage of the talks on the creation of an international security organization should be confined to the most important issues and principles.¹⁷

The 8-Day Flight

The Soviet delegation, headed by A. A. Gromyko, who had been appointed USSR ambassador to the United States by that time, was made up of diplomats, historians, jurists and military leaders. I was also a member of the delegation, serving in the capacity of secretary-interpreter. Our flight from Moscow to Washington took almost 8 full days: The hostilities in Europe and in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans necessitated a trans-Siberian route. The plane flew over Chukotka, Alaska and Canada. We were grounded for hours by heavy fog and bad weather in several places and, besides this, we flew only in the daytime. At the airport in Washington we were met by Assistant Secretary of State Edward Stettinius (the head of the American delegation) and Alexander Cadogan, the English deputy foreign minister who had arrived from London previously (and who headed the British delegation). An honor guard was formed. The airport was decorated with the national flags of the three powers.

The opening ceremonies of the conference were just as festive. Everyone gathered in the main auditorium of the three-story building in Dumbarton Oaks on the morning of 21 August. The first plenary session was called to order by U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull. He said that the preservation of peace and security in the future would be the main goal of international cooperation. "In the Moscow declaration," Hull stressed, "each government also took on a share of administrative responsibility for the creation of the international organization, pursuing this goal through the combined efforts of all peaceful countries."¹⁸

The head of the Soviet delegation spoke next, saying that the mere wish to curb aggression and to use force against it would not be enough to preserve peace and security. It would be essential, A. A. Gromyko emphasized, to have the necessary resources for the prevention or suppression of aggression and the preservation of international order. The Soviet representative said that

the unity of the allies in the struggle against their common enemy and their desire to keep the peace in the future would guarantee the positive outcome of this series of investigative talks.¹⁹

A. Cadogan noted that the documents prepared by each side had many common features. What we see, the English representative went on to say, is the common determination of the three most powerful countries of our time to create a world organization within the near future. Cadogan also thanked the Soviet Government for suggesting the organization of this series of discussions.²⁰

The speeches by representatives of the three powers recorded common views on a number of fundamental issues. The people who gathered at Dumbarton Oaks, however, represented, as mentioned above, states with differing social systems. Their interests and political aims in matters of postwar construction were distinguished by profound differences.

Soviet diplomacy wanted a world free of armed conflicts and aggression, a world in which the people of the Soviet Union and all other states could peacefully engage in constructive labor. For this reason, the new international security organization should be, according to the Soviet side, based on the principles of the sovereign equality of its members.

Monopolist circles in the United States and England, however, wanted to secure the hegemony of American and British imperialism in the postwar world at the expense and to the detriment of the interests of other countries. This is why Washington and London were interested in the kind of international organization that would not interfere with these plans and, what would be even better, might sanction aggressive actions by imperialist forces. The war the United States started in Korea in 1950 under the UN banner was a clear example of these expectations.

Hiss, Chambers and Reagan

A recess was called after the end of the opening ceremonies, and the heads of the delegations met unofficially at three o'clock that day to discuss basic procedural matters. They agreed that English and Russian would be the official conference languages, that Stettinius would be the permanent conference chairman and that the heads of the three delegations would approve all press releases. They decided not to have a transcript of the proceedings. Instead, brief notes were taken and were approved by the delegation heads. They agreed that the Soviet memorandum should serve as the basis of the discussion. An administrative committee was formed, made up of the heads of the delegations and the conference participants they invited to each specific meeting.

Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko usually invited me to interpret at these committee meetings, preferring, just as at the plenary sessions, to speak Russian. My duties included recording the minutes of the conference. Minutes were also kept by Gladwin Jebb on the English side and Alger Hiss on the American side. Besides this, Hiss headed the conference secretariat. We usually gathered in his room after each meeting and combined all three records of the proceedings. Afterward, late in the evening, each of us coordinated the draft with the delegation head.

After the minutes had been approved, Jebb, Hiss and I would meet again to compile the final draft and to distribute it to all conference participants before the beginning of the next morning's meeting.

Hiss appeared to be an extremely qualified and energetic man. Even when the work was in full swing, he invested it with a calm and businesslike atmosphere. Hiss' services were greatly appreciated: Roosevelt took him to Yalta, and he was later one of the heads of the American delegation at the San Francisco conference on the United Nations. Hiss later occupied high-level positions in the State Department and the Carnegie Endowment. Soon afterward, however, his career came to a sudden halt. Hiss became a victim of the anticommunist "witch hunt" organized by the notorious Senator Joseph McCarthy, who headed the congressional Committee on Un-American Activities. R. Nixon was also working on the committee at that time. In his book "Six Crises," he described his part in the "Hiss case" in detail. Nixon quoted a remark by one of his friends that if it had not been for the "Hiss case," he (Nixon) would "never have become the vice-president of the United States or a candidate for the presidency."

In the first chapter of this book, Nixon admits: "The Hiss case was the first major crisis of my political career. My name, my reputation and my career as a 35-year-old freshman congressman in 1948 would always be associated with my decisions and actions in this case."²¹

After the "Hiss case," Nixon did become famous, but this fame was essentially nothing to brag about. The entire case was put together by the Un-American Activities Committee for the purpose of stirring up anticommunist and anti-Soviet hysteria and to simultaneously discredit all of the U.S.-USSR agreements and pacts of the war years. In addition, the committee wanted to denigrate the war alliance of the Soviet and American people in the struggle against a common enemy. Along with Nixon, another man who played a prominent role in this "case" and in the investigation of the so-called "communist infiltration" of the U.S. Government was Whittaker Chambers, a renegade and provocateur who invented the absurd story that he kept microfilm, containing secret information supposedly delivered to him by Alger Hiss, in a pumpkin in his garden.²² In the atmosphere of the obscurantist excesses in the United States at the end of the 1940's, this questionable "testimony" was enough to ruin a man's reputation. The entire "case" was a pack of flagrant lies, and decent Americans turned their backs on police agent Chambers.

It is indicative, however, that President Reagan has now awarded this provocateur the highest government honor posthumously--the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Reagan declared that he regards Chambers as "an unsurpassed intellectual and a man of integrity, whose life is a symbol of the struggle for freedom." We might wonder why Chambers earned this honor 23 years after his death. Might it not be that his contribution to the anti-Soviet hysteria of the 1940's was in tune with the views of the current inhabitant of the White House?

The Disagreement Over the Term "Aggression"

During the Dumbarton Oaks conference the United States and England disagreed several times with the USSR on matters of principle connected with the nature and powers of the new security organization.

As soon as the Soviet memorandum began to be discussed, the American side questioned the acceptability of the term "aggression." Stettinius declared that the entire first point, in which this term was used, required special examination. Cadogan also objected to the use of the term "aggression," saying that its use could give rise to difficulties. There had been many cases, he said, when two countries had been at war but it was impossible to determine which had been the aggressor. For this reason, Cadogan concluded, the use of the term "aggression" will only obscure the goal we all want to attain.

The Soviet delegate resolutely objected to this approach. He said that one of the functions of the security organization would consist in determining which country was the aggressor in each specific situation. "This is the sacred duty of the future international security organization," A. A. Gromyko stressed. "If we do not state this directly, we will simply make it easier for the potential aggressor to perform his evil deeds."²³

The American and English representatives continued to avoid defining the term "aggression" and tried to exclude it from the charter of the future international organization. They cited various formal and technical reasons. Cadogan, for example, said that what was important was not the definition of aggression, but the ability of the organization to put an end to the conflict. For this reason, lengthy debates on which of the countries was the aggressor would simply waste the organization's time. American delegate James Dunn said that the term "aggression" had been discussed for many years in the League of Nations but that no agreement had been reached on the matter. Sweeping these arguments aside, the Soviet representative pointed out the fact that it was precisely the absence of an exact definition of aggression that had kept the previous organization from taking measures against those who broke the peace. He reminded the others that the League of Nations had been unable to reach an agreement on the term because of the opposition of influential Western political groups. Encouraging the fascist rulers, Western politicians thereby created a loophole, A. A. Gromyko said, "allowing the potential aggressor not only to attack, but to attack with impunity."

Point 1 of the section on the aims of the organization received preliminary approval in the following form: "The maintenance of world peace and security and the institution of effective collective measures for this purpose to prevent and eliminate threats to peace and violations of the peace."²⁴ Later, as a result of the Soviet delegation's efforts, the point was expanded. The UN Charter says: "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace."²⁵

The mention of "acts of aggression" in the UN Charter is of fundamental significance.

Why did the U.S. and English representatives in Dumbarton Oaks object so stubbornly to the inclusion of a definition of the term "aggression" in the document prepared there? Now, looking back over the last four decades, it is particularly evident that this was connected with the aggressive nature of the capitalist powers. Flagrant acts of seizure and imperialist aggression in

Korea, in Vietnam, in the Middle East and in the Caribbean basin, right up to the recent criminal U.S. attack on Grenada, testify quite eloquently as to who would have been bothered by the precise definition of aggression in the UN Charter and why. The position taken by the U.S. and English delegations in Dumbarton Oaks proves that even when the creation of a new international security organization was being contemplated, Washington and London wanted to leave their hands free in the anticipation of a situation in which the unambiguous definition of aggression might complicate all types of imperialist ventures.

The Problem of the Unanimity of the Great Powers

When the plans for the creation of the future security organization were discussed by the three foreign ministers in Moscow, by the leaders of the great powers in Tehran and in subsequent correspondence between Moscow, London and Washington, it was invariably stressed that the new organization should be based on the unity of the great powers. The most heated debates in Dumbarton Oaks, however, concerned precisely this matter. The problem consisted in the voting procedure in the Security Council--the new organization's supervising body. Judging by the American memorandum, the Soviet and American views initially coincided. Later, however, the American delegation supported the English in their contention that a dispute involving a permanent council member should be regarded as an exception to the general rule of unanimity. The USSR delegation took a negative view of this proposal, saying that this procedure could undermine the unity of the great powers--the cornerstone of the entire security organization.

The matter was debated throughout the conference. A. A. Gromyko reported to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on 7 September 1944:

"The English and American delegations both categorically insist on their proposal that when conflicts are discussed in the council, the representatives of countries directly involved in the dispute, including countries with a permanent seat, may not cast a vote. Cadogan declared that he had again received orders from his government to adhere to this position. I said that we are also adhering to our previous opinion, that the great powers, on which the organization will confer the chief responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, have reason to expect special consideration when the council discusses cases of conflict affecting them.... The discussion has indicated that we are not likely to find a common ground with the English and Americans on this matter, at least not at this conference."²⁶

The Western delegations continued to pressure the Soviets. Stettinius assured them that the American Senate would not endorse a document giving voting rights to one of the sides in a conflict. He then expressed the hope that the Soviet Union's "intractable" position would not lead to a situation in which the United Nations would not be created at all, because the small countries, he said, would not consent to the procedure proposed by the Soviet side.

President Roosevelt also used the argument of the small countries when he invited the Soviet ambassador over to discuss the council voting procedure. In a report to Moscow on this conversation, A. A. Gromyko included a detailed

list of Roosevelt's arguments, which essentially implied that "if the great powers would put themselves in a privileged position in comparison to other countries, the smaller countries would certainly object to this and they might not even want to be members of the organization.... Getting to the crux of the matter," the Soviet ambassador's wire went on to say, "I said that we also attached great significance to the voting procedure, and that the adoption of the last American proposal would signify a substantial departure from the principle of the unanimity of permanent council members in council decisions. I also said that the original American proposal, contained in their memorandum, coincided with our proposal and that the differences of opinion arose after the American delegation had departed from its original proposal."²⁷

Although diplomatic decorum was observed during the meeting with Roosevelt, the very fact of such high-level intervention in conference affairs says a great deal. Besides this, the President sent a letter to the head of the Soviet Government specifically to express worries about the status of the talks in Dumbarton Oaks. "Apparently," Roosevelt informed Stalin, "there is still one important matter on which we have not reached an agreement. This is the matter of council votes. We and the British are firmly convinced that disputing sides should not vote when the council makes decisions, even if one of the sides is a permanent member of the council, whereas your government, as I understood your ambassador to say, holds the opposite view." Referring again to the "position of small nations," Roosevelt continued: "I hope that you will be able to ask your delegation to agree with our proposal on voting. If this could be done, the talks in Dumbarton Oaks could be concluded quickly with complete and outstanding success."²⁸

Roosevelt's intervention did not, however, solve the problem. In Stalin's reply, he reminded Roosevelt of the original American proposal and stressed that it was precisely this proposal that seemed right to him. "Otherwise," he explained, "the agreement we reached in Tehran, based on the principle of securing the united action of the four powers, needed for the struggle against aggression in the future, will be null and void." This unity, Stalin went on to say, "presupposes, of course, that there will be no room for mutual suspicion among these powers. As for the Soviet Union, it also cannot ignore the presence of certain absurd prejudices that often interfere with a truly objective attitude toward the USSR. And other countries must weigh the consequences of the absence of unity on the part of the great powers."²⁹

The warning about the implications of confrontations between the great powers was completely pertinent. Even many Western politicians had expressed doubts about the projected Anglo-American procedure. Differences of opinion also arose within the American group at the Dumbarton Oaks conference. Some U.S. delegates believed that a failure to reach an agreement on council voting procedure could have an adverse effect on the development of the war in Europe and on the prospect of the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan. It was also not certain that Congress would consent to the limitation of U.S. voting rights in a dispute affecting American interests. American diplomat Charles Bohlen, who was present at the Dumbarton Oaks conference, testified: "In the United States there were widespread feelings against membership in an organization that could impose its will on us under certain circumstances."³⁰

The U.S. Government continued, however, to insist on having its own way. Why? At that time, Washington felt that its interests in the new international organization were reliably secured. When the American delegation proposed "non-participation" in voting, it certainly did not, despite all possible idealistic beliefs, display objectivity. Since the Soviet Union was then the only socialist power in the world, people in Washington and London were certain that the United States and England would have an absolute majority in the organization's council and assembly in all cases. Their willingness to subject themselves to the same procedure did not cost them anything. They presumed that no council member (with the exception of the USSR) would dare to vote against the United States and England because all of them would be bound to these countries by a multitude of economic, political, ideological and military ties. But they did want to deprive the USSR of the right to participate in votes directly related to its interests. Obviously, the Soviet Union could not permit a situation in which the capitalist powers would have the right to dictate their will to the socialist state under the cover of the United Nations.

Later, during the course of the Yalta conference of the leaders of the three powers and the subsequent correspondence between Stalin and Roosevelt, the Americans modified their position and approached the Soviet point of view. A mutually acceptable agreement was reached, and it is reflected in the final draft of the UN Charter. It contains an unambiguous statement about the need to observe the principle of the unanimity of the great powers--the permanent members of the Security Council. Throughout the lengthy history of the United Nations, this principle has blocked the intrigues of reactionary forces, who have tried repeatedly to use the authority of the international organization as a cover for all kinds of ventures and acts of imperialist intervention in the affairs of other countries.

The Undermining of the United Nations

During the final stages of the creation of the United Nations and even during the conference in San Francisco, where the organization was formally founded in June 1945, some influential Americans were convinced that the USSR should be kept out of the organization. At the end of April 1945, President H. Truman, who moved into the White House after Roosevelt's death and who redirected U.S. policy toward confrontation with the Soviet Union, declared that he intended to advance the plans for the new international organization under any circumstances, and "if the Russians do not want to join us, they can go to Hell."³¹ People in Washington were dreaming of creating a totally obedient United Nations without the Soviet Union, or, in essence, against it. One of the most influential U.S. legislators of that time, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, wrote in his diary: "Russia might withdraw. If it does, the conference (in San Francisco--V. B.) will go on without Russia.... We must stick to our guns.... This is exactly the time when we can win and stop coddling the Reds before it is too late."³²

There is no question that these belligerent plans were nurtured by the atom bomb, the work on which was close to completion.

When Senator Fulbright analyzed the situation in summer 1945, he noted that the late President's heirs had no intention of carrying out Roosevelt's

plans for the postwar international security organization. "Whereas Wilson's great creation (the League of Nations--V. B.) was left to the mercy of skeptical Europeans," Fulbright wrote, "Franklin Roosevelt's plan was put in the care of unsympathetic people in his own country."³³

Crude attacks on the United Nations and its agencies are again being heard in Washington. In our day, now that the world situation has changed dramatically and the United Nations represents 158 countries, and not the 35 to 50 states Roosevelt predicted 40 years ago, the United States has to use its "veto power," that is, to block Security Council decisions, more often. Furthermore, Washington even resorts to direct threats and blackmail when it encounters unpleasant resolutions. This is exactly what is happening now in the United States' treatment of UNESCO and other UN agencies, which has already been discussed in our magazine.³⁴

Washington displayed the same kind of contempt when the World Court handed down its decision on Nicaragua's complaint against the United States in connection with the continuous diversionary actions, subversive activity and direct aggression committed by counterrevolutionary gangs with the active support and participation of the United States. As we can see, there is no longer any concern about the respect for the position of "small countries," not to mention the compliance with the decisions of the majority, to which the American delegates in Dumbarton Oaks referred in such pompous terms.

The Soviet Union and all other peaceful countries have invariably defended the goals and principles of the UN Charter. Our country's position is clearly reflected in the papers of the Dumbarton Oaks conference, which was one of the significant events in the diplomatic history of World War II. The decisions made at this conference under far from simple circumstances provide further evidence of the ability of states with differing social systems to reach mutually acceptable agreements. The proposals drafted in Dumbarton Oaks on the creation of an international security organization laid the foundations for the UN Charter, which secured the ability of the United Nations to play an important positive role in the world arena for almost four decades now.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoy voyny" [The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union During the Patriotic War], vol I, Moscow, 1944, p 169.
2. "Sovetskiy Soyuz na mezhdunarodnykh konferentsiyakh perioda Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg." [The Soviet Union at International Conferences During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], vol III. "The Dumbarton Oaks Conference of Representatives of the USSR, United States and Great Britain (21 August-28 September 1944). Collected Documents," Moscow, 1978, p 8.
3. "Sovetsko-amerikanskiye otnosheniya vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg." [Soviet-American Relations During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], vol I, 1941-1943, Moscow, 1984, p 300.

4. "Moskovskaya konferentsiya ministrov insotrannykh del SSSR, SShA i Velikobritanii. 19-30 oktyabrya 1943" [The Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, United States and Great Britain, 19-30 October 1943], Moscow, 1978, p 314.
5. Ibid., pp 321-322.
6. V. M. Berezhev, "Rozhdeniye koalitsii" [Birth of the Coalition], Moscow, 1975, pp 205, 224.
7. "Sovetsko-amerikanskiye otnosheniya vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg.," vol I, p 43.
8. D. Yergin, "Shattered Peace," Boston, 1977, p 57.
9. "Sovetsko-amerikanskiye otnosheniya..., " p 339.
10. Ibid., pp 446-451.
11. "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer. Transcript of Hearings Before Personal Security Board. Washington, 12 April 1954 to 6 May 1954," Wash., 1954, p 173.
12. Herbert Feis, "Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought," Princeton, 1967, pp 149-151.
13. "President's Map Room Papers," Naval Aide's File, box 172--General Folder, FDR Library, Hyde Park (N.Y.), s. a.
14. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza..., " vol I, p 369.
15. "The Dumbarton Oaks Conference..., " pp 51-68.
16. Ibid., pp 73-99.
17. Ibid., pp 102-106.
18. Ibid., p 112.
19. Ibid., p 114.
20. Ibid., pp 115-116.
21. R. Nixon, "Six Crises," N.Y., 1962, p 1.
22. Ibid., pp 49-51.
23. "The Dumbarton Oaks Conference..., " p 117.
24. Ibid., p 151.

25. "Charter of the United Nations," ch I, art 1, § 1.
26. "The Dumbarton Oaks Conference...", p 176.
27. Ibid., p 179.
28. "Perepiska Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR s Prezidentami SShA i Prem'yer-ministrami Velikobritanii vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945" [Correspondence of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers with U.S. Presidents and British Prime Ministers During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], vol 2, Moscow, 1976, pp 167-168.
29. Ibid., pp 168-169.
30. C. Bohlen, "Witness to History 1929-1969," N.Y., 1973, p 159.
31. A. Harriman and E. Abel, "Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941-1946," N.Y., 1975, p 452.
32. A. Vandenberg, "Private Papers," Arthur Vandenberg Papers, University of Michigan, p 178.
33. W. Fulbright, "The Crippled Giant," N.Y., 1972, pp 19-20.
34. V. L. Roshchin, "Overt Blackmail," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 5.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1984

8588

CSO: 1803/1

U.S. SEEN STEPPING UP USE OF COCOM FOR 'TRADE WAR'

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 84 (signed to press 17 Jul 84) pp 80-84

[Article by A. V. Kunitsyn: "Trade War Weapon"]

[Text] This fall the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control (CoCom) will be 35 years old.¹ Since the time of its creation, this agency has been known as a political instrument of the opponents of East-West trade and economic cooperation.

During the cold war its activities had the aim of deterring the economic development of socialist countries by prohibiting the sale of a broad variety of Western manufactured goods to them. During the period of international detente many potential East-West trade commodities were also artificially withdrawn from this trade through CoCom's efforts.

Washington has been trying to stimulate heightened CoCom activity since the beginning of the 1980's, essentially for the purpose of reviving the spirit of confrontation in East-West economic relations. The Reagan Administration, which announced a "crusade" against communism, regards CoCom as a tried and tested weapon for the subversion of mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation by states with differing social systems. American diplomacy has two interrelated aims: to heighten CoCom's effectiveness and to use it for the standardization of the trade policy of NATO partners and Japan according to the American model.

To these ends, Washington has announced an extensive program for the "modernization" of the multilateral export control system of the NATO countries and Japan in the following main areas: stricter control over exports of goods and technology to the USSR; the standardization of licensing procedures in CoCom countries; the extensive involvement of military agencies in the engineering and pursuit of export policy; the addition of certain types of the latest technology to CoCom lists.

American appeals for the reinforcement of CoCom and for broader restrictions on exports to socialist countries have generally been substantiated by the need for "heightened Western vigilance under the conditions of the serious deterioration of relations with the East." It should be borne in mind, however, that

the plans for stricter multilateral export control by the NATO countries were being drawn up in the United States long before the exacerbation of international affairs at the start of the 1980's. The idea was originally broached in a special study by the U.S. Defense Department's Committee on Science in 1976 (the Busey report). The conclusions and recommendations in this report were reflected in the export regulation act of 1979, which assigned the Pentagon the responsibility of compiling a list of "critical" military technology as a supplement to the general list of controlled commodities used in the licensing of American exports.

In line with the "modernization" program, during the last review of CoCom restrictive lists in 1982-1984 (the previous one was in 1979-1980), the United States proposed the inclusion of another close to 50 groups or categories of goods (by the beginning of 1982, there were around 160 categories of goods on the CoCom lists), which, in Washington's opinion, should not be sold to the Soviet Union.² They included, in particular, gas turbines, large-capacity floating docks, the technology for the production of several special alloys, silicon materials for the electronics industry, the technology for the manufacture of printed circuits, space vehicles, robot equipment, ceramic materials for motor engineering, broadcasting equipment, electronic computers, software and computer "know-how."

To attain these goals, Washington again, just as in the cold war years, resorted to frightening its partners with the curtailment of shipments of American manufactured goods and technology and the institution of additional import restrictions if they should not comply with U.S. requests. A report on "Technology and East-West Trade," prepared in 1983 by experts from the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress, said that "the review of CoCom lists, besides being important in East-West trade, has also been important in West-West trade, because the Reagan Administration has made changes in controls on American trade with committee members conditional upon progress in CoCom"(that is, upon the tractability of partners--A. K.). While the lists were being updated in Paris, London's FINANCIAL TIMES reported, Washington was threatening that "if the Europeans do not agree with American proposals in CoCom, their purchases of American technology could suffer and the access of European exporters to the American market could be restricted."

Under pressure from Washington, CoCom restrictions on exports to socialist states were expanded, although not to the degree desired by the Reagan Administration. According to Japan's NIHON KEIZAI newspaper, three new items were added to the CoCom lists: equipment for the manufacture of ultra-complex alloys,³ facilities for the manufacture of polychlorbiphenyl and space research equipment. A decision was made to make export restrictions more rigid for around 10 commercial categories (floating docks, silicon, carbon filament, polishing equipment, bearings, etc.). Besides this, the members of CoCom agreed to add technology in the development stage, particularly the technology of robot engineering, to the list of goods prohibited for export.

The U.S. administration failed, however, in its attempts to force its partners to add equipment for the extraction, refining and transport of oil and gas to the list of goods prohibited for export to the USSR. In addition, no agreement

was reached on the prohibition of the sale of computer programming equipment to socialist countries. There were also differences of opinion on some other matters.

The United States is trying to involve the neutral West European states and nonaligned countries in its attempts to erect new barriers for exports to socialist countries. According to EAST-WEST, a magazine published in Brussels, the United States has been conducting intensive talks with certain countries such as Switzerland, Austria, Finland and India since 1982 about their "voluntary" participation in the control of exports to CEMA countries. Quoting an American source, the magazine noted that Switzerland, for example, agreed to be guided by new CoCom technology export restrictions. According to a Swiss Ministry of the Public Economy spokesman, this will allow Switzerland to "have its previous access to Western technology." There have also been reports of the Austrian Government's consent to control exports to socialist countries. When Austrian Foreign Minister E. Lanc met with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz in February 1984 in Washington, however, the Austrian side stressed that the American measures to institute stricter technology transfer controls discriminated against Austria and were inconsistent with the two countries' common desire to expand American capital investments in the Austrian economy. In general, EAST-WEST concluded, "the CoCom 'modernization' will probably reduce the assortment of advanced foreign technology exportable to the communist countries." It is significant, however, that neutral and nonaligned states pay less attention to Washington's recommendations on export restrictions than the CoCom countries.

At present, the U.S. Government is emphasizing restrictions on the transfer of technology and the latest scientific and technical achievements in the sphere of export control in general and in CoCom in particular. American imperialist circles are strengthening this form of control with a far-reaching goal in mind--to isolate the countries of the socialist community from world scientific and technical progress, stifle their international foreign trade and economic influence and inhibit the scientific, technical and economic development of these countries.

In the United States, just as in some places in Western Europe, there have been more frequent appeals to reinforce the CoCom organizational structure, to turn it into a legally secured body with a permanent staff and to create special inspection agencies in each of the CoCom countries to oversee the enforcement of export controls. For example, a report on "East-West Trade at the Crossroads: Economic Relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," prepared by R. Ruse, M. Matsukawa and A. Gutowski for the Trilateral Commission, says that multilateral export control would be more productive "if the members could invest CoCom with a firm legal status by founding an official organization, preferably on a treaty basis."

The Reagan Administration's position on the organizational reinforcement of CoCom was expressed in May 1983 by Assistant Secretary of Defense R. Perle, who said that the White House is in favor of taking such measures as increasing the CoCom budget from the present 50,000 dollars to several million, moving CoCom headquarters from the American Embassy in Paris to a special

building of its own, reinforcing the CoCom staff by adding an "independent" secretary-general, increasing the number of technical experts and forming a subcommittee of military advisers.

An analysis of CoCom activity in the 1980's indicates that this body is again, just as in the cold war era, essentially being turned into an appendage of the American export control system and is being used by the United States as an instrument of its policy. American ruling circles are not only pursuing the mass-scale political goals of confrontation with the socialist world, but are also furthering the greedy ambitions of American monopolies, which want to weaken West European and Japanese rivals. This policy has naturally given rise to disagreements and conflicts among CoCom members.

The U.S.-proposed stricter multilateral control over exports to socialist countries is having a negative effect on the foreign economic relations of CoCom members. On the one hand, it is artificially depriving them of the advantages of trade, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation with the socialist countries and, on the other, it is introducing additional complexities into economic relations between Western states by giving rise to the unavoidable complication of bureaucratic procedures, delaying deliveries and so forth. It is therefore not surprising that large segments of the Western business community have a negative opinion of Washington's plans to strengthen CoCom and continue the expansion of export restrictions.

There is another aspect of CoCom activity which is earning it more opponents within the Western business community. In the 1970's the Western press reported several times that CoCom was turning into a central agency of "unscrupulous methods" of competition. For example, the need to submit an application to CoCom with detailed information about the projected transaction not only increases the risk of deliberate counteraction by competitors, but also creates, in the words of the American magazine ELECTRONICS, "ideal conditions for industrial espionage." In the 1970's the stricter multilateral control over exports heightened these fears perceptibly in the Western business community. "Stricter control," the Trilateral Commission report said, "will heighten the concern that has already been expressed by many firms and some countries about the risk of the 'exposure' of information about industrial processes and commodities through the CoCom system." The business community is also dissatisfied with the secrecy shrouding the CoCom lists and the criteria used in the issuance of licenses. Under these conditions, it is difficult for the exporter to know in advance whether or not a transaction will be approved.

Substantial conflicts in CoCom work arise in connection with the differing political approaches of members to East-West economic relations. In particular, additional confusion is introduced into committee activities by the American differentiated approach to the countries of the socialist community and the attempts to urge this approach on other CoCom members. In addition, the United States has recently been trying to secure special CoCom rules for China.

Back in January 1980, THE LOS ANGELES TIMES reported, the United States approached its partners with the proposal that "the rules governing the

sale of the latest equipment and technology to communist countries be changed for the benefit of China, but not the Soviet Union." In summer 1981 the United States, Japan and the leading West European states reached an agreement on the relaxation of restrictions on strategic exports to the PRC. According to Japan's NIHON KEIZAI, exceptions were made for China in 140 categories of goods, including electronic equipment.

The next relaxation of CoCom restrictions on exports to the PRC took place in fall 1983, after a similar action had been taken by the United States. Commenting on the change in CoCom policy, the same newspaper remarked that "now it will draw a more precise distinction between China on one side and the USSR and the socialist countries of Europe on the other." According to reports in the Western press, in March 1984, when the American-Chinese Trade and Economic Council was meeting in Beijing, the Chinese representatives requested their U.S. partners to exclude China from the list of countries subject to CoCom export limitations.

The very mechanism of the committee's functioning, differences in national systems of export control and differences in the approaches of members to the goals and criteria of this control are impeding Washington's efforts to augment CoCom's role in its antisocialist strategy. The report of the Office of Technology Assessment says, for example, that "the United States pays more toward its maintenance than other CoCom countries and conducts more serious investigations of violations. Some other countries do not enforce export controls and only a few impose fines on violators." Under these conditions, the United States sometimes encounters a situation in which the cooperation of CoCom partners is not as close as the American administration would like.

Current trends in the export policy of the United States and other NATO countries, reflected specifically in CoCom's more active restrictive practices, have not escaped the notice of socialist states. The principled position of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community is well-known. "All of us can see," Chairman N. A. Tikhonov of the USSR Council of Ministers, head of the Soviet delegation at the 37th meeting of the CEMA Session in October 1983, said at the meeting, "the kind of pathological persistence the current American administration is displaying in its attempts to use international trade to exert political pressure on the socialist countries. Washington is stubbornly imposing its line of undermining economic ties with our countries on its NATO allies. Of course, we must take this into consideration. Our community has all it needs for the collective defense of its technical and economic invulnerability. The production of many items previously purchased from the United States and from countries supporting the discriminatory actions of the American leadership has been organized in the Soviet chemical, metallurgical and machine-building industries in recent years. Additional assignments have been drawn up in this field for 1984-1990." A decision was adopted at the meeting to determine specific ways of organizing the joint CEMA production of several goods subject to Western export restrictions.

Strictly observing the principles recorded in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the USSR has invariably made an effort to develop economic relations with all states willing to cooperate on an equitable and mutually beneficial basis and have not tried to use these

relations as a means of political pressure. This policy meets the interests of lasting peace and the objective requirements of world economic development.

FOOTNOTES

1. CoCom is a permanent intergovernmental body of the NATO countries (with the exception of Iceland and Spain) and Japan, created in 1949 on the initiative of the United States and operating on the basis of a "gentlemen's agreement" and in an atmosphere of secrecy. Its functions include the compilation of lists of Western goods and technology whose export to socialist countries is prohibited or restricted, and the supervision of the observance of export restrictions. For a detailed description of this committee, see O. Ye. Tishchenko, "CoCom, the United States and Trade with the USSR," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, No 10.
2. There are three main lists of goods whose export to socialist countries is controlled by CoCom: The first is a list of military products, the second is a list of goods used in nuclear power engineering, and the third is a list of industrial equipment and materials. CoCom's main concern is the third list, which includes "dual-purpose" goods--that is, civilian products with a possible military purpose, and goods manufactured with the aid of the latest technology.
3. This applies mainly to refractory alloys containing nickel and cobalt and used in the manufacture of aircraft engines and gas turbines.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1984

8588

CSO: 1803/1

KOKOSHIN REVIEWS BOOK ON NON-MILITARY FORCES IN U.S. POLICY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 84 (signed to press 17 Jul 84) pp 109-115

[Review by N. A. Dolgoplova and A. A. Kokoshin of book "Nevoyennyye faktory sily vo vneshney politike SShA" [Non-Military Factors of Strength in U.S. Foreign Policy] by I. L. Sheydina, Moscow, Nauka, 1984: "A Contribution to Soviet Studies of American Affairs"]

[Text] This book by Inna L'vovna Sheydina, doctor of historical sciences and leading researcher at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences was published after her untimely death. For a long time I. L. Sheydina worked in the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, where she grew into a prominent Soviet expert on American affairs. She was distinguished by a thorough working knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and methodology and by highly professional research. I. L. Sheydina had a brilliant personality and was a gifted scholar. At the same time, she always displayed such valuable qualities as the ability to work in a group for the study of various topics through concerted effort. Her early death (she died of an incurable illness at the age of 41) was a severe loss for Soviet studies of American affairs and for her comrades and colleagues.

I. L. Sheydina worked with our magazine productively for many years. In particular, she wrote and published the following articles: "American Expert Appraisal Methods" (1971, No 9), "'Alabama Has Everything...'" (1976, Nos 10-11) and "New Instruments of 'Foreign Policy Strength' in the Era of Technological Revolution" (1981, No 8).

This lengthy work by I. L. Sheydina covers a group of topics pertaining to the United States' position in the current system of international relations and to the instruments, means and methods of American foreign policy strategy and diplomacy.

The author cogently demonstrates that arms buildups and the threat of war were (and are) the "permanent background for the employment of various non-military

factors of strength in U.S. policy." Furthermore, activity in non-military spheres of world politics certainly does not preclude, and sometimes even presupposes, the continued buildup of American imperialism's military strength; military strength, as I. L. Sheydina correctly points out, not only has the "last word," but is also expected by many Washington strategists to serve as the "shield" or "umbrella" under which America can make use of its entire arsenal of non-military foreign policy instruments to maximum advantage.

It is particularly significant that more general aspects of the theory of international relations, particularly those connected with the concept of "force" in general and with the various forms it takes in the foreign policy of states, are also analyzed thoroughly from a Marxist-Leninist standpoint in the book. Therefore, the analytical significance of the book is much broader and deeper than its title suggests.

The Marxist-Leninist approach to problems of force in contemporary international relations, especially intergovernmental affairs, should not, as the author writes, be confined to the consideration of such indicators as territorial dimensions, the size of the population, the supply of natural resources, etc. Obviously, these indicators are important, but they are only prerequisites and they do not automatically determine the strength of the state or its role in international relations. In Marxist-Leninist theory, the fundamental factors in this context are the method of manufacturing material goods and the socioeconomic structure of the society; the development level of the method of production is also significant. "All public power and all political force are rooted in economic prerequisites, in the history of the specific society's method of production and exchange," F. Engels stressed.¹

In an explanation of the material basis of state strength, I. L. Sheydina writes that such indicators as the structure of the national economy, its technical level of production, the volume of industrial and agricultural production, the level of education and science and the scales and impact of the practical use of scientific and technical achievements must be taken into account in addition to natural conditions and human resources. At the same time, Marxists have never confined the meaning of the term "force" only to economic considerations, regarding this approach as a vulgarization of the materialistic view of history and a dangerous oversimplification. Marxism also does not believe, as I. L. Sheydina notes, in confining the concept of "force" to military strength alone, which is characteristic of a colossal number of works by bourgeois theorists, politicians, military leaders and diplomats. Marxist-Leninist science stresses that factors of political morale can be just as important as economic and military factors, and sometimes they can even be the deciding components of force. This is closely related to the well-known Marxist statement that ideas which appeal to the masses turn into a powerful physical force. It is no coincidence that the author of this work looks back into the very dawn of the history of the Soviet State, when V. I. Lenin regarded the moral factor--the significance of the example set by the world's first socialist state--as the foundation of the young Soviet Republic's present and future influence.

Taking a dialectical approach to the examination of the interaction of various factors of state strength, I. L. Sheydina notes that factors of political morale have an even stronger impact when they rest on a strong material basis. There is no automatic connection, however, between the growth of economic, military and political potential and the state's influence in world affairs. Purely material advantages do not always increase the state's importance in world politics. For example, physical expansion could be accompanied by the decline of prestige, the loss of political morale and related unfavorable changes in the state's general position in the system of international relations. The leading state in the capitalist world, the United States of America, has provided several examples of this and is still providing them. The author is correct in noting that the open diplomacy declared by the young Soviet State and its direct appeals to public opinion throughout the world illuminated and strengthened the increased importance of the factor of morale (including sociopsychological considerations) in contemporary international relations.

Diplomacy plays a substantial role in determining the state's significance in international affairs. The skillful diplomatic behavior of a country, resting on a thoroughly developed foreign policy strategy, can compensate for its weaknesses in several other areas. This was also repeatedly and conclusively demonstrated by the Soviet State in the first years of its existence.

As the author correctly points out, the Marxist approach to the assessment of strength is extensive and dialectical. Without absolutizing any single component of strength, the Marxist approach is based on the realization that the important thing is not strength itself, but the reasons for its use. It can be used to establish hegemony, to impose unequal relations on other states and, finally, to inflict direct injuries on other states. This is how force has been used by states during most of human history. State strength can also be used for constructive purposes, however, under present conditions. This was the first socialist state's approach to the use of force literally from the moment of its birth. And today the Soviet Union is still demonstrating the constructive approach to the development of relations with all other states and a willingness to use its growing strength in the interests of all mankind, and not for selfish purposes.

The Soviet approach to international security is closely related to this. As K. U. Chernenko said, "the Soviet Union does not intend to strengthen its security at the expense of others, but wants equal security for all."²

This analysis of the analytical aspects of the concept of strength could be continued by investigating a matter I. L. Sheydina did not discuss in her work--the differences in concepts of strength as an active instrument, which can be used directly by the state leadership, or as the objective basis determining the position of the state in the system of international (or inter-governmental) relations during a specific period of history, as well as the balance of power between states--a structural and more stable category. It is obvious, however, that in this work strength is regarded more as a category for the description of processes in the system of international relations, and not the description of its structure.

I. L. Sheydina examines the approaches of American theorists and politicians to state strength and its use in intergovernmental relations in detail, demonstrating the important role of concepts emphasizing precisely the military strength of the state and the manipulation of this strength on the broadest scales, to the point of thermonuclear war. Nevertheless, as I. L. Sheydina cogently writes, bourgeois theorists and politicians in the United States have displayed important differences in their interpretations of the concept of state strength in the last two decades; they are the result of deep-seated objective changes which have taken place in the international arena and have affected the position of the United States in the system of intergovernmental relations.

Many American researchers, particularly in the beginning and the middle of the 1970's, began to concentrate on non-military factors of strength in international relations, primarily under the influence of the Soviet Union's achievement of strategic parity with the United States and the defeat of American imperialism in Vietnam. The colossal American military strength turned out to be powerless in the struggle against the Vietnamese people, supported to the maximum by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. However, both the Americans who regard military strength as the main argument in world politics and those who attach primary significance to non-military factors of strength and influence constantly emphasize the use of strength in ways allowing the United States to impose its wishes on other countries and other subjects of international relations. Furthermore, the American supporters of reliance on non-military factors of strength are inconsistent and have displayed an inclination to resort to political and military blackmail, or even to the most direct and flagrant use of armed forces, in crisis situations. From I. L. Sheydina's analysis of the views of bourgeois theorists and politicians representing various currents, we can conclude that apologists for authoritarianism are characteristic of almost all of their analyses, regardless of the role they assign to military strength.

As a thorough and precise researcher, I. L. Sheydina analyzed the concept of "authoritarianism" in detail in her work. She stresses that this concept cannot be equated with the overt use of brute strength, and that the term "authoritarianism" has a much broader meaning. It includes direct action and indirect coercion, oppression and enslavement, including a form implying "the complete consent of the enslaved." The author bases this explanation on the ideas expressed by F. Engels in "Anti-Duehring," where he referred to an earlier interpretation of authoritarianism and coercion by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I. L. Sheydina uses this analytical premise as the basis of her analysis, focusing precisely on the use of camouflaged authoritarianism by the United States, often "not only with the consent, but almost at the request, of those the United States is able to put in a dependent position." I. L. Sheydina stresses in her work that coercion can be accomplished not only by "punishment" or the threat of punishment--that is, overt pressure--but also by rewards. Both of these methods ("the stick and the carrot"), the author stresses, "are still the main means used by any bourgeois state to attain foreign policy goals, their main methods of foreign policy action." After describing these methods, I. L. Sheydina draws a conclusion of exceptional importance for the comprehension of the machinery of forcible influence, the

conclusion that they are ultimately intended to reduce the choices available to the state subjected to "negative" (punishment) or "positive" (reward) pressure.

When we examine the section of I. L. Sheydina's work on general methodology and theory, we are naturally impressed by her original and extremely interesting system for the classification of the methods of state influence in international affairs. She lists four methods of exerting forcible pressure: the first is the overt or direct use of any kind of force for a direct effect on the international situation; the second is the coercion of the other side to take action (or, on the contrary, to refrain from taking action) with the use of either threats or promises; the third consists in persuading or convincing the other side of its "own" wish to take action (or refrain from it); the fourth method consists in suggesting a course of action to the state subjected to pressure in the anticipation (or fear) of the possible use of force against it (American theorist K. Knorr aptly calls this situation a "silent mechanism"). As the author correctly points out, the last case is probably the most widely used and simultaneously one of the least noticeable to the outside observer.

In her research, I. L. Sheydina made use of numerous sources and publications, displaying a thorough understanding of the origins of current U.S. foreign policy. She reveals the roots of the current state of affairs in the use of force by the United States in international affairs and in the balance of military and non-military factors.

The author examines long-range tendencies in this area and describes the connections between them and tendencies of shorter duration, as well as various deviations from the main long- or medium-range tendencies which sometimes confuse researchers who forget about the historical perspective of a particular process.

The author cogently shows that the main result of the growth of non-military factors of force in American foreign policy was firm Soviet opposition to all attempts by American ruling circles to settle the question of confrontation by military and political-military means. It was of extreme importance that the United States was not able to keep its monopoly on nuclear weapons for long, and that the Soviet Union quickly developed weapon systems capable of destroying targets within the territory of the United States itself. As I. L. Sheydina correctly writes, by the end of the 1950's the myth of "U.S. invulnerability and impunity even in the event of a U.S.-instigated thermonuclear war had been debunked, it turned out that 'absolute strength' did not exist and it was therefore necessary to consider the use of more circumspect and more flexible forms of confrontation, including confrontation in the military sphere." The launching of the first satellite by the Soviet Union in 1957 played a tremendous role in the reassessment of various components of strength in international relations by American political analysts and ruling circles. The entire world, including the United States, was convinced that the USSR had achieved great successes not only in equalizing the Soviet-American military balance but also in refuting the myth of the USSR's general and supposedly insurmountable tendency to lag behind the United States in science and technology.

It is also significant that Soviet successes in space exploration motivated the revision of all U.S. policy in the spheres of education, science and applied research and development. Responding to the "challenge" of the world's first socialist state, American ruling circles dramatically increased government allocations for the training of engineering, technical and scientific personnel and for research and development in the most diverse fields of science and technology after the Soviet satellite had been launched.

This was accompanied by a considerable increase in military R & D allocations, and in the 1960's the United States attempted the most powerful buildup of its own strategic potential in the hope of creating a situation of superiority to the USSR even after the loss of the nuclear monopoly and of strategic invulnerability. When U.S. military-industrial circles escalated the arms race, they hoped to retain the role of military strength and to use it actively in confrontation with the Soviet Union, in the struggle against the national liberation movement and even in the exertion of pressure on NATO allies, which displayed less and less willingness to blindly follow in the footsteps of the United States in the 1960's.

It took a great deal of time, however, for American Government and political leaders to realize the futility of these hopes and the impossibility of acquiring any kind of tangible or significant military and political strategic superiority to the USSR. The acknowledgment of strategic parity and the principle of equality and equivalent security was an exceptionally painful and complex matter for the United States--this was made particularly evident by later events. But it was only on the basis of these principles that extremely important and constructive steps were taken to normalize Soviet-American relations, strengthen international security, reduce the danger of nuclear war and limit strategic arms in the beginning and middle of the 1970's. It was at this time that the United States began to make active use of non-military factors of strength, and it was at this time that American political analysts, government officials and politicians began to pay more attention to these factors.

I. L. Sheydina analyzes economic instruments, the levers of so-called "technological strength" and the instruments of ideological and politico-diplomatic influence at the disposal of Washington foreign policy strategists. She concentrates on the general economic, scientific and technical foundation for the use of various forms and means of military strength, correctly singling out state activities in the economic sphere as the most important aspect of American economic development. The author cogently demonstrates how the American bourgeois government promoted, and is still promoting, the development of such sectors of the economy as nuclear power engineering, missile engineering, electronics, aviation, ship building, machine building, chemicals and transport equipment--that is, the sectors which will largely determine rates of economic growth in the future and directly stimulate the continued acceleration of technological progress. As I. L. Sheydina correctly points out, however, the deciding factor and main stimulus in the increased role of the U.S. Government, including its role in scientific and technical progress, was the militarization of the American economy and American science, accompanied by the dramatic increase in peacetime military spending, an arms race and

the tremendous growth of the military bureaucracy. This occurred in the beginning and middle of the 1970's, after absolute and relative military spending had been reduced for some time as a result of the end of the war in Vietnam.

I. L. Sheydina cogently proves that the American belief that "everything has its price" has become so firmly entrenched in the American mind that it is even being employed directly by the government in international affairs. Furthermore, many American authors seem to sincerely believe that this is a constructive and beneficial principle; these authors advise a stronger emphasis on non-military factors precisely because they involve more frequent and more extensive rewards, which are supposed to be morally more acceptable than overt coercion. These ideologists stress that the American economic "big stick" has been discredited in many respects; furthermore, it quite often injured American interests. For this reason, they advise greater reliance on the use of various lures, such as the practice of offering other countries economic, scientific, technical and administrative assistance, access to American equipment and technology, participation in large-scale technical projects, etc.

Besides this, there have always been American supporters of overtly brutal actions involving the use of economic instruments against the countries of the socialist community, developing states and even allies. The position of this group has become much stronger under the Reagan Administration. The "sanctions" against the USSR and Poland are a vivid example of this kind of action, and I. L. Sheydina correctly describes them as the overt subordination of trade and economic relations between states to the goals of political blackmail and pressure.

In a discussion of the economic instruments used by U.S. foreign policy strategists, I. L. Sheydina analyzes foreign trade, the export of capital, the activities of transnational corporations, U.S. policy in raw material markets and economic aid.

In her investigation of the levers of "technological strength," the author thoroughly analyzes Washington's efforts to attach other capitalist countries and developing states to the United States with the aid of transfers of technical innovations, the export of management and so-called "technology of global scales" (the author uses this term to signify the use of U.S. scientific and technical ties with other countries to deal with global problems resulting from the achievements of the technological revolution, such as the peaceful use of outer space, the development of the world ocean, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, environmental protection, etc.). In particular, she provides conclusive evidence that the U.S. space programs were regarded as an integral part of U.S. domestic and foreign policy almost from the very beginning.

In recent years the United States, which was just recently the unrivaled leader in this sphere in the capitalist world, has been experiencing increasing pressure from Western Europe and Japan. The Soviet Union, as I. L. Sheydina notes, was the only state with which the United States had to consent to truly equal and mutually beneficial cooperation in space exploration.

Analyzing the instruments of ideological influence, I. L. Sheydina discusses the U.S. practice of disseminating new ideological stereotypes, the U.S. informational and propaganda expansion in the world and the activities of the "Peace Corps," representing an example of social missionary work. The author's system for the classification of instruments of ideological influence is innovative. The great pertinence of this subject is also indisputable, particularly under the conditions of the intensification of the ideological struggle and the increasingly important role of the ideological factor.

In the chapter on politico-diplomatic instruments, the author concentrates on "alternative models of U.S. behavior" and on American diplomatic activity in the creation of alliances and coalitions. Obviously, the author could not discuss the entire range of politico-diplomatic instruments in a single chapter. In particular, these policy instruments could also include secret subversive operations to destabilize and eliminate regimes not to Washington's liking, which are often conducted (as in the case of Salvador Allende's Popular Unity government in Chile) with the close cooperation of American special services and interested transnational corporations.

The late 1970's and early 1980's demonstrated that the new cycle of U.S. adaptation to the realities of contemporary international relations had again been replaced by ambitious attempts to convert these realities to meet U.S. specifications. And although this kind of "conversion"--given the current balance of power in the world--is beyond U.S. capabilities, this policy poses a great danger to the cause of peace. After all, this is a matter of much more aggressive American imperialism and attempts to regain America's previous role through reliance on military strength. Military preparations have been stepped up and expanded considerably, military appropriations have been increased, and more and more new weapon systems have been developed. The current U.S. leadership is taking the corresponding course of action in international affairs, refusing to engage in constructive arms limitation and reduction talks with the Soviet Union and simultaneously making active use of threats of force or military strength in world politics. As a result, non-military factors of strength are either relegated to the background or are employed, as mentioned above, in cruder forms.

The use of non-military factors of strength is now more in the interests of Western Europe and Japan than in the interests of the United States, and this is one of the reasons for the recent prevalence of pro-Reagan feelings in the United States. The emphasis on military strength in international relations is regarded by several American political analysts and politicians as a means of acquiring additional levers of influence on the NATO allies as well as the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community; in comparison to the allies, the United States is much more superior in military and strategic terms than in, for example, technological and economic terms (and in terms of many economic, scientific, technical and financial parameters, the United States has simply had to yield first place to the European Economic Community).

An analysis of the state of affairs in the United States and in the NATO countries indicates that this policy line is being actively resisted not only by the broad popular masses but even by several political leaders of states

officially regarded as U.S. allies. "Leaders of Western countries and influential political parties do not all approve of the U.S. Administration's adventurism either. It also disturbs a large segment of the American public. People there are becoming increasingly aware that the intensification of militarization and the aggravation of international affairs have not and will not give the United States military superiority and political advantages. They are only leading to increasing criticism of Washington's belligerence throughout the world. People want peace and tranquility, and not war hysteria," K. U. Chernenko said.³

Many Western politicians who criticize American policy believe that the emphasis on military strength in international relations is not only counter-productive and ineffective from the standpoint of the class interests of the American bourgeoisie in the international arena, but is also exceptionally dangerous and could lead to total thermonuclear catastrophe. Besides this, the growth of the military budget and the waste of government funds and resources on the development of more and more new weapon systems, in the opinion of political and business groups opposing the Reagan Administration, will reduce the United States' ability to compete with the two other main centers of capitalism--Japan and Western Europe--in the world arena.

I. L. Sheydina's book is distinguished by the highly professional treatment of sources and literature, a clear and lucid style and remarkable skill in the translation of quotations with the retention of the nuances and shades of meaning that are so important in any scientific work (and a work on political history in particular). The ability to reveal and analyze these nuances and shades of meaning is characteristic of the work in general, which is of a self-contained and original nature. The author adhered to high research standards and presented her findings clearly. In terms of all of its characteristics, its content and its level of analytical generalizations, I. L. Sheydina's work "Nevoyennyye factory sily vo vneshney politike SShA" represents a thorough work and a significant contribution to the Marxist-Leninist theory of international relations.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Vol 20, p 224.
2. K. U. Chernenko, "Narod i partiya yediny" [The People and the Party Are One], Moscow, 1984, p 26.
3. Ibid., pp 24-25.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1984

8588

CSO: 1803/1

TWO WESTERN BOOKS ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 84 (signed to press 17 Jul 84) pp 116-119

[Review by V. F. Davydov of books "Controlling the Bomb. Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980's" by Lewis A. Dunn, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1982, XII + 209 pages; "Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation" by Allan S. Krass, Peter Boskma, Boelle Elzen and Wim A. Smith, London, Taylor and Francis, SIPRI, 1983, XVIII + 296 pages]

[Text] The books under review deal with nuclear nonproliferation. The first was written by a former Hudson Institute researcher who is now the assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The second book was prepared by a team of researchers from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

According to L. Dunn, the state of affairs in the sphere of nuclear nonproliferation is certainly a matter of serious concern. Looking back over the process by which the club of "nuclear states" grew, the author concludes that the number of nuclear powers might rise dramatically in the 1980's. "We are now entering a much more dangerous stage of nuclear proliferation, in which the possession of bombs by states located in crisis regions is not only possible but most probable and, consequently, in which the danger of their actual use is mounting" (p I). Dunn includes South Africa, Israel, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, the South Korean regime, Taiwan and some other states among the "threshold" countries.

Over the four decades since the first atom bomb was exploded, scientific knowledge and information and the technology for the production of nuclear devices have been widely disseminated. As a result, the number of "threshold" states with the material capability to manufacture nuclear munitions is an even 25, and it is still rising. The number of suppliers of nuclear materials and technology is also rising in the capitalist world. Whereas the main suppliers were once the United States and Canada, they have now been joined by rivals from Western Europe--France, the FRG, Italy and Switzerland. There is also a new group of countries possessing nuclear technology and materials in the developing world: Argentina, Brazil and India. There is also something like a "black-market" in the world, where various types of technical equipment and materials can be acquired for the production of nuclear weapons, and specialists capable of heading these projects can be hired. In view of these

trends, Dunn feels that the policy concentrating only on the limitation of the material capability of states in the nuclear sphere is largely obsolete.

"Competition and differences of opinion among the main exporters of nuclear technology and materials, the growth of the 'black-market' and the appearance of new nuclear suppliers among the developing states could all accelerate the continued erosion of technical obstacles to the development of nuclear weapons in the next few years. It is obvious that the technical barriers are already the 'depleted assets' of the nonproliferation policy" (p 43).

The fierce competition in the conventional arms market has provided "threshold" countries with the latest airborne means of delivering nuclear weapons. Some of these states are now mastering the production of short-range missiles and are showing a greater interest in space research for military purposes.

Dunn pointedly criticizes the American researchers who feel that the further spread of nuclear weapons could have a stabilizing effect on relations between "threshold" countries in crisis regions. He feels that the presence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of conflicting sides will not only heighten political friction between them but could also lead to local nuclear conflicts. "The spread of nuclear weapons to crisis regions will dramatically intensify the threat of their use" (p 75).

He is particularly disturbed by the prospect of the involvement of today's nuclear states in a local nuclear conflict, which could lead to global catastrophe. This is why Dunn insists that the United States engage in broader consultations and exchanges of opinions with other nuclear states, including the USSR, on nuclear proliferation in crisis regions. "Apparently," he writes, "the time has come for closer cooperation by the superpowers in the resolution of problems in regional conflicts whose escalation could lead to a local nuclear skirmish and direct confrontation between the United States and the USSR" (p 174).

It is true that Dunn, just as the majority of other American researchers, still cherishes the illusion that the further spread of nuclear weapons will be more dangerous to the USSR than to the United States because the main "threshold" countries are far away from the United States (p 83). This distinction, however, is artificial and actually false. There are also some "threshold" countries close to the United States, particularly in Latin America. There is no doubt that the security of the entire world, including the United States, will be seriously jeopardized by the appearance of a new nuclear state in any part of the world. Dunn has to admit that even states with Boeing 707 or 747 civilian planes will be capable of a nuclear attack on U.S. territory (p 84).

Examining the measures that might be taken to reduce incentives for the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons, Dunn recommends that the United States make a more precise and unambiguous pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. "If other nuclear states assume the same commitments, this will establish a precedent or rule that new nuclear countries will also have to observe" (p 129). The author also takes a positive view of the pledge not to use nuclear weapons first in relations between nuclear states, regarding it as one of the foundations of world security in the nuclear age. Dunn does not, however, mention in his book that the USSR has pledged not to

use nuclear weapons against states which have refused to acquire these weapons and do not have them within their territory, and a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. The United States, on the other hand, is still stubbornly refusing to follow the USSR's example and act in accordance with the wishes and demands of non-nuclear states.

The author also obviously underestimates the positive value of the limitation and reduction of existing nuclear arsenals and the total cessation of nuclear tests. On the one hand, Dunn admits that the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is living through a difficult time, marked by the danger of the withdrawal of certain states. On the other hand, he does not want to recognize that this is happening through the fault of the United States, which is not honoring its own obligations with regard to Article VI of the non-proliferation treaty and is still escalating the nuclear arms race. The development of more and more new types of nuclear weapons and the Reagan Administration's adherence to doctrines of their use will certainly injure the policy of nonproliferation. Unfortunately, Dunn does not pay serious attention to this matter in his book, but it is the deciding factor in the non-nuclear states' views on the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The second of these books, published under SIPRI auspices, investigates the connection between the mastery of uranium concentration processes in various countries and the mounting threat of nuclear proliferation. With a view to the fact that all of today's nuclear powers were able to develop nuclear weapons after they had mastered the concentration of uranium, the authors are unanimous in the opinion that the activities of non-nuclear states must be watched constantly. "The concentration of uranium has always played an important role in nuclear proliferation" (p 41).

In the authors' opinion, the present situation in world nuclear power engineering is paradoxical. On the one hand, the worldwide economic crisis reduced orders for nuclear power plants and consequently created a surplus of fuel made of concentrated uranium. On the other hand, in spite of the surplus, more and more countries are striving to acquire uranium concentration technology. Whereas concentrated uranium was once produced only by nuclear countries--the United States, England and France--it is now being produced by the FRG, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Japan, Australia, South Africa, Israel, Pakistan, India, Brazil, Argentina and other countries (p 34).

The authors believe that different countries have different motives for the establishment of national uranium concentration facilities. For industrially developed countries such as Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Australia, for example, the main motive is commercial and stems from the hope of a stronger position in the world markets for nuclear materials. In view of the fact that these countries are signatories of the nonproliferation treaty and that their concentration facilities are under IAEA control, the authors feel that their mastery of uranium concentration technology will not pose the threat of nuclear proliferation. It is another matter when countries which are not signatories of the treaty--South Africa, Israel, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina and others--establish such facilities. This understandably arouses concern. "In view of this tendency, the risk of nuclear proliferation through the concentration of uranium is growing. More and more countries with

ambiguous feelings about nonproliferation could quickly acquire the ability to concentrate uranium and could have access to the poorly controlled uranium at concentration plants" (p 40).

In view of this prospect, the international control and inspection of uranium concentration facilities and plants are particularly important. "If all existing concentration facilities were to be put under IAEA control, the risk of nuclear proliferation would be reduced substantially" (p 53). But the authors have to admit that this goal is unattainable: "It is not likely that all concentration facilities in the world will be under IAEA control in the near future" (p 53).

Leading suppliers of nuclear technology and materials in the capitalist world could neutralize the non-nuclear countries' incentives to establish their own concentration facilities. However, as experience has shown, their policy is inconsistent, is sometimes colored by the narrow egotistical interests of the moment and is so nearsighted that it could produce the opposite results in the sphere of the nonproliferation of dangerous types of nuclear technology. The United States, for example, passed a law, on the one hand, which prohibits the economic or military assistance of countries engaging in secret uranium concentration projects. On the other, despite the fact that this kind of work is obviously being conducted in Pakistan for the development of a nuclear bomb, Washington resumed the assistance of Islamabad in 1981, rationalizing this action with references to the need for Western military preparations in South Asia (p 55).

The authors believe that some measures by exporting states to stop the proliferation of the dangerous types of nuclear technology could delay the mastery of uranium concentration and plutonium regeneration processes in other countries. This would be a positive result if the time thus saved could be used productively for effective policy in the sphere of nuclear nonproliferation. In the absence of this kind of policy, the delay, according to the authors, would be meaningless. "Unilateral measures can injure nonproliferation policy and increase tension between the suppliers and consumers of nuclear technology and materials" (p 60).

The authors recommend that exporting countries give more serious consideration to a multilateral approach to problems connected with the proliferation of uranium concentration facilities. In particular, they advocate the creation of a single international center for the production of slightly enriched uranium for all of the world's nuclear power plants.

The existence of this kind of center would make the efforts of individual countries to master concentration processes unnecessary, and this would dramatically reduce the risk of the use of uranium for military purposes. The authors are aware, however, of the political, economic and technical difficulties standing in the way of this plan. In their opinion, the main question now, from the political standpoint, is the following: "Will the international community take enough interest in this project to ensure its success?" (p 80).

One of the book's good points is that the authors do not confine the issue of nuclear nonproliferation to the rapidly developing uranium concentration

industry in a number of countries. They give serious consideration to methods of controlling dangerous types of nuclear technology and materials and state that nonproliferation policy will be effective only when nuclear weapons lose their present significance in international relations.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1984

8588

CSO: 1803/1

'SECRETS' OF THE 'STEALTH' PROGRAM

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 84 (signed to press 17 Jul 84) pp 124-127

[Article by I. O. Lavrukhin]

[Text] In 1975 the American Air Force leadership decided to begin work on a research program for the development of equipment to complicate the detection of aircraft by radar infrared, optical and acoustic systems. Many things led up to the decision.

During the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, 80 percent of the planes the Israeli Air Force lost were shot down by land-based air defense equipment. The main reason for the losses was the ineffectiveness of the American Wild Weasel electronic neutralization system, which could not disorient radar-operated artillery and air defense missiles.

The battle between the airplane and radar began during World War II and is still going on. In 1943 the English dropped aluminum foil streamers from their planes to camouflage them during the night bombings of fascist Germany. As a result, German radar operators saw only a profusion of bright lights, resembling snow, on the radar screen. This simple trick reduced the English command's bomber losses, but it would not keep today's radar from pinpointing the location of a target. In particular, radar capabilities were augmented by the use of computers, which have dramatically accelerated the processing of incoming data. The improvement of radar systems was accompanied by the development of radar defense equipment. As the war of 1973 in the Middle East demonstrated, however, even the use of planes designed expressly for electronic warfare cannot guarantee the effective radar protection of planes. As Western experts have pointed out, a more promising way of heightening the survivability of airplanes in combat consists in minimizing their revealing features.

What is it that discloses an airplane in flight? Above all, it is the dimensions and contrast of the plane's outlines against the sky or ground, the trail of smoke the engines leave and the noise they make. The visual detection range is not great, however, particularly in bad weather and at night, and for this reason there is not always time to take the necessary defensive actions. Detection with the aid of various types of technical equipment, even in the absence of visual contact—for example, infrared gauges sensitive to

differences in temperature between the "heated" plane and the colder air around it--is much more reliable and valuable. Radar, however, is still the chief means, surpassing all others in terms of detection range. Its superiority was reinforced after several countries began to arm themselves with long-range radar detection planes. On planes of this type, a radar set raised to a height of 9-10 kilometers can detect, for example, a low-flying bomber at a distance of 500 kilometers. Timely detection is extremely important in combat, as this is the primary prerequisite for the destruction of the enemy plane.

At the beginning of May 1975 the U.S. Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency signed a contract with the McDonnell-Douglas firm for the design of an "inconspicuous airplane." Northrop, Lockheed and Rockwell International were awarded similar contracts later that year.

In 1976 Northrop and Lockheed each began working on a small fighter plane at the request of the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory. This program was called "Stealth."¹ The same name was then given to the equipment projected for use on the updated airborne cruise missile (ACM). The ACM is in the development stage, but other weapons of this type--the land-based Tomahawk missiles--began to be deployed in Western Europe at the end of 1983.

The "Stealth" program was first announced at a press conference on 22 August 1980. Then Secretary of Defense Brown and his assistant, Director Perry of Defense Research and Engineering, spoke at the conference. Brown boasted of the merits of the "Stealth" equipment, which had allowed the United States to build planes supposedly incapable of being intercepted by existing air defense systems. According to Perry, by summer 1977 the "Stealth" equipment had been developed to such a degree that plans were made to use it on various types of planes. He went on to say that research allocations for the "Stealth" program were increased tenfold in 1977 (when the decision was made to step up the program),² and that current expenditures were 100 times as great.

Although technical information about the "Stealth" program was not published, the main features making a plane difficult to detect are widely known. The most important feature is the surface dispersion factor (SDF), which depends on dimensions (their reduction produces a weaker radar signal), shape and structural materials. A plane with fewer flat surfaces and sharp angles and with a smoother, more rounded shape will produce a weaker radar signal. The "Stealth" equipment also uses radio absorbent materials and covers, devices to reduce the plane's heat emissions and electronic suppression systems.

The test flights of the double-engine jet "Stealth" plane, built by the Lockheed firm on an Air Force contract, began in 1978. According to published reports, four or five experimental planes were built, but two of them crashed. The tests were conducted near Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, and the planes took off from the CIA-guarded secret airfield called the "Rancho." The plane is triangular in shape and was designed as a "flying wedge." Its engines are located within the fuselage. It has no vertical tail assembly. The entire appearance of the plane attests to an emphasis on streamlining. The choice of this shape was not coincidental: It is easier for this kind of plane to make smooth turns. Why was this necessary?

Everyone has seen an ordinary flat piece of glass. When the sun's rays hit it, it reflects light in a specific direction. But if the glass is curved, the rays will be dispersed in various directions. This is the principle lying at the basis of the circles and curves of the "Stealth" plane, which reflects the electromagnetic waves of a radar set in all directions, as a result of which only a small portion reaches the radar antenna.

Non-metallic compounds are another element capable of absorbing radio waves, and they were used in various parts of the plane because these materials combine light weight, strength and durability. The absorption effect stems from their molecular structure, with each molecule serving as something like a microscopic mirror. When the electromagnetic signal from a radar set penetrates these materials, it wanders from one "mirror" to another, as if in a maze. This neutralizes part of the signal, and what does emerge is severely weakened.

The heat emitted by the "Stealth" plane is reduced by screened nozzles on the engines. Besides this, the planes have electronic defense systems.

It is known that the detection range of airborne air defense equipment depends on the SDF. For example, the SDF of the B-52 bomber, built between 1954 and 1962, is 100 square meters, the estimated SDF of the B-1B is only 1 square meter, and the figure for the advanced technology bomber (ATB), according to official statements, is supposed to be minimal in comparison to the previous figure, and on the radar screen the plane will look like a harmless bug or will not be seen at all.

Some foreign experts have stressed, however, that not all types of radar are "helpless" in this respect: The "Stealth" will be visible to a long-range, low-frequency radar set with a broad directional field. Besides this, the deciding factor in the uncertainty as to the "invisibility" of the ATB is its size. The bomber might not have the same degree of "invisibility" as the smaller fighter plane.

After Reagan took office, the new administration embarked on a new arms buildup. The plans for a new strategic bomber were prominent in the military program.

Four designs were considered for series production: the "elongated" version of the FB-111, submitted by General Dynamics; Rockwell International's two B-1 models; and the "Stealth" plane that Lockheed and Northrop were trying to develop.

In fall 1981, two bombers were chosen instead of one--the updated B-1, which was called the B-1B, and the "Stealth," which also began to be called the ATB. Why were two chosen? According to the Air Force leadership, they will supplement one another. First the B-1B will break through air defense systems, but after the ATB has taken over this function the B-1B will be used as a cruise missile carrier.

When Reagan was running for office, he heard about the project and announced that he would certainly support the "Stealth" model if he should win the

election. Reagan not only kept his promise but also allocated huge sums for this purpose. The Northrop Corporation, as the main contractor in the ATB bomber project for 1982-1987, received a contract in the amount of 7.3 billion dollars. The ATB should be ready for combat in 1991.³

Many people in the United States were surprised when the contract was awarded to Northrop. They could not understand how this firm (with around 29,000 employees in 1980), occupying around the 15th place on the list of the Pentagon's main suppliers, could win out over Lockheed--one of the oldest and largest American corporations (70,000 employees) which had been among the top five military contractors for years and had more than 60 years of experience in aircraft engineering. Besides this, the construction of the experimental "Stealth" plane firmly convinced Lockheed that it would receive the ATB contract. Nevertheless, Northrop was declared the winner of this contest. The main reason was that Northrop, which had received the same kind of research contract as Lockheed for the "inconspicuous plane" in 1975, had been more successful than Lockheed in the concluding stage of the "Stealth's" development. Besides this, according to BUSINESS WEEK, the view that contracts should not be awarded automatically to "ineffective" firms finally prevailed. This negative description fully applies to the Lockheed Corporation. Several of its civilian and military programs of the last two decades were unsuccessful.

One was the program for the first American turbo-prop airliner, the "Electra." Gross technical errors were committed when it was built in 1959. After two airliners crashed, all of the planes that had been sold were recalled by the plant.

The program for the "Starfighter," the multi-purpose F-104 fighter plane, resulted in a scandal of equal proportions. The poor adaptation of the plane to West European weather conditions led to many accidents.

In the 1970's serious defects were discovered in the largest American C-5A military transport plane, the "Galaxy" (a Lockheed product). The maximum payload had to be reduced by 40 tons because the plane was structurally weak. This failure to observe the terms of a contract put Lockheed in a difficult financial position. To save the firm from bankruptcy, former President Nixon asked the Congress to approve a loan of 250 million dollars.

In 1983 Lockheed had to stop the series production of the wide-body "Tristar" L-1011 airliner, which proved to be less economical and reliable than the planes of other firms.

In spite of these failures, Lockheed, with its broad range of products, has maintained its status on the strength of its more successful military programs. Although the contract for the ATB went to its competitor, Lockheed won a consolation contract for the construction of 20 "Stealth" fighters over a period of 2 years. According to plans, C-5 "Galaxy" planes will carry them to hot spots for special missions.⁴

The Northrop Corporation (with its headquarters in Los Angeles, California) produces combat and training planes as well as airborne targets, electronic

and navigational equipment and landing and rescue systems for space vehicles. In the last two decades, however, its main product has been the F-5 fighter plane.

Northrop owes its promotion primarily to the Reagan Administration's plans for an arms buildup. This administration represents the interests of the military-industrial complex in general and the West Coast in particular. Whereas such leading firms as General Dynamics, McDonnell-Douglas, United Technologies and Lockheed delivered 1.5-2 times as many military products to the Pentagon in FY 1982 as in 1979, Northrop delivered 2.7 times as many (from 586 million dollars to 1.6 billion).⁵

In 1982 the corporation made the largest capital investments in its history when it purchased equipment for the development of the ATB. It bought an automobile plant in Los Angeles from the Ford Motor Company for 65 million dollars and then began the frenzied retooling of the plant, in two 12-hour shifts each day without a break, for the construction of the bomber.

At the beginning of September 1982, Rockwell and Lockheed signed an agreement on a 10-year joint development project for the new bomber, based on the B-1 model and using "Stealth" technology, which is supposed to become the competitor of the Northrop firm's plane. It will be almost the same size as the B-1, which is 44 meters long, but in contrast to its rival it will have a larger variety of weapons, including conventional or nuclear bombs or missiles, whereas the ATB is designed for the delivery of only nuclear bombs. Nevertheless, in the draft military budget for FY 1985, the Reagan Administration, which is intensifying the race for strategic arms, assigned priority to the "Stealth" program by requesting 2.2 billion dollars for its further development.

FOOTNOTES

1. DEFENSE DAILY, 15 September 1980, p 64.
2. INTERAVIA AIR LETTER, 27 August 1980, p 5.
3. FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, 24 October 1981, p 1235.
4. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 12 October 1981, p 17.
5. INTERAVIA AIR LETTER, 21 April 1983, p 2.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1984

8588

CSO: 1803/1

- END -

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

10 Dec 1984